



ДВЕНАДЦАТЬ ПОБЕД
ЛАВРЕНТИЯ
БЕРИИ



ЖИЗНЬ ЗА СТАЛИНА

Abstract

Many consider Lavrenty Beria the most effective manager of the 20th century and the grand master of the secret war. Although it is more correct to call him the closest associate of Joseph Stalin. They are united by a common huge thirty-year work to create a powerful, sovereign Russia. Lavrenty Beria lived an active, exciting life and won 12 great victories, each of which remained forever in the history of the Soviet Union. Unique photographs of the first half of the 20th century show the results of these victories!

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Sergey Kremlev

**12 wins of Lavrenty Beria. Life for
Stalin**

Foreword

Stalin's First Lieutenant

LAVRENTY Pavlovich Beria ... In the Khrushchev USSR, his name was not just crossed out, but they tried to cut it out of Soviet history with a razor - cut it out in the literal sense of the word. In the Brezhnev USSR, Beria was rarely remembered and in the same tone as in the Khrushchev years. In the heat of perestroika, he was remembered loudly. But they remembered in order to certify a "monster", "sexual maniac", etc. But in general - an "executioner" - a fiend of Stalin's "hell" called "GULAG".


Why did the "catasterists" remember Beria at all? After all, it could still be hushed up. But for some reason, they remembered not the half-forgotten Bulganin, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Yezhov, but remembered Beria.

Why?

But is it because the growth of **a healthy** public interest in the figure and activity of Lavrenty Pavlovich was already close? And it was necessary to try to preempt honest researchers who were still only approaching the topic of Beria, only comprehending it not opportunistically, but historically and humanly adequately.

There was a resurgence of interest in Beria in the West as well, and Soviet intelligence "specialist" Amy Knight published a biography of Beria in the 1990s under the title Beria. Stalin's First Lieutenant. In English, the word "lieutenant" means not only a military rank, but also "deputy".

So, the Western biographer of Lavrenty Pavlovich assigned him the role of Stalin's first deputy. Moreover, in the Russian language - as an exact tracing-paper with "First Lieutenant" - there is directly the concept of "first lieutenant", meaning the closest, especially trusted, empowered comrade-in-arms of the commander or state leader.



Amy Knight's book was first published in 1993.

Such was Lavrenty Beria for Stalin, who passed away into history at the fifty-fifth - just something of a kind - year. He proved to be one of the most active, and at the same time one of the most "multi-station" figures in the history of the Russian state, and a simple list of only major posts that Lavrenty

Pavlovich held, convincingly proves this: the chairman of the Georgian Cheka, the chairman of the OGPU of Transcaucasia, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, from the beginning of the war - a member of the State Defense Committee and then - Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, chairman of the "atomic" Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR,

member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU ... Politically closer Molotov was to Stalin, but only Stalin did more for the power of Soviet Russia than Beria. Indirectly, this was confirmed when trying to wrest the name of Beria from the consciousness of Soviet society "with meat". The story of the removal of the name and merits of Beria from Soviet history turned out to be really amusing - almost comical, if not for the tragedy of the fate of Lavrenty Pavlovich. Khrushchev's apparatchiks decided to cut Beria out of history with a razor blade, and in 1953 subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia received a package by mail with several 82 x 108/16 printed sheets and a quarter sheet. Typographically, it read as follows:


TO A SUBSCRIBER OF THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA

The State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" recommends removing pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 from TSB volume 5, as well as a portrait pasted between pages 22 and 23, in exchange for which pages with new text will be sent to you.

Use scissors or a razor blade to cut off the indicated pages, leaving margins near the spine to which new pages should be glued.

State Scientific Publishing House "**Great
Soviet Encyclopedia**"

But it has long been said that the severity of Russian laws is moderated by their faulty enforcement. So it happened here too ... The Khrushchevites ordered to cut out a huge article about Beria on pages 21 to 24, as well as his portrait. But certain references to Beria were not in one, and not in two, but in many volumes of the 2nd edition of the TSB. For example, the carving masters forgot to look at the first volume of the TSB, signed for publication on December 15, 1949, in the article "Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic". Therefore, even after 1953, anyone could read on page 449 of the 1st volume of the 2nd edition of the TSB that "the direct conductors of Lenin's and Stalin's instructions on the liberation movement in the Transcaucasus were their faithful students - G.K. Ordzhonikidze, S.M. Kirov, A.I. Mikoyan, L.P. Beria..."



Article about Lavrenty Beria in the 5th volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia

ПОДПИСЧИКУ
БОЛЬШОЙ СОВЕТСКОЙ ЭНЦИКЛОПЕДИИ

Государственное научное издательство «Большая Советская Энциклопедия» рекомендует изъять из 5 тома БСЭ 21, 22, 23 и 24 страницы, а также портрет, вклеенный между 22 и 23 страницами, взамен которых Вам высылаются страницы с новым текстом.

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*Государственное научное издательство
«Большая Советская Энциклопедия»*

Leaflet indicating to subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Of course, the role of Beria in the revolution and the civil war was not even close to that of Mikoyan, not to mention Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, so the name of Beria was “made up” here by the authors of TSB-2, as they say, retroactively, although ... Although as a result, the role of Beria in the development of the Soviet Transcaucasus, freed from the pre-revolutionary fetters of foreign capital, turned out to be comparable to the role of the first three major Bolsheviks mentioned in

TSB-2. And even more

significant. The name of Beria was also mentioned in the article about the AzSSR on pages 450, 452, 454, 455... Party Khrushchevite bureaucrats would not be bureaucrats if they approached their duties differently than they did. Having sent subscribers a recommendation to work with a razor or scissors, they lost sight of the fact that such a figure as Lavrenty Pavlovich cannot be cut out of history in one fell swoop. So, picking up the volume of the 12th second edition of the TSB, signed for printing on May 28, 1952, we will also find the name of Beria in the article “State Defense Committee”. And this is not all! According to **the uncut** data of TSB-2, which eluded the censorship of the Khrushchevites, by 1953:

a) in Armenia there was a Beriev region, a canal named after Beria, park of culture and recreation. L.P. Beria in Leninakan (volume 3 TSB-2):

b) in Georgia, the Abkhaz state farm "Afali-Afoni" bore the name of Beria, Sukhumi Pedagogical Institute, Tkvarcheli State District Power Plant (Volume 1 TSB-2), a machine-building plant in Batumi, a shoe factory in Tbilisi, Sukhumi region, Georgian

Agricultural Institute, Tbilisi Palace of Pioneers and schoolchildren, and the Dynamo stadium - also in Tbilisi (volume 13 TSB-2). Moreover, a photo of the stadium in Tbilisi with the caption: "Stadium named after L.P. Beria", and remained between pages 68 and 69 of the 13th volume of TSB-2 cut out.



Georgian State Agricultural Institute.

One of the oldest universities in Georgia has been leading its history since 1929



Tbilisi Palace of Pioneers and Schoolchildren. L, P, Beria

Azerbaijan did not forget about Beria either - the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee did a lot for the republic and its oil industry. Beria's name was given to a car repair plant in Baku and a large oil field. There were in the Transcaucasus the Leninakan border detachment named after Beria and the theater in Poti named after him, the Khashuri electric locomotive depot, and the Agarinsky sugar factory. It was not easy, not easy, it turned out, to black out the name of Beria from everywhere. More precisely, it is impossible!

TODAY much has been written and said about Beria, but interest in him is growing, and this is understandable. They lied about the man for a long time and vilely. And suddenly it turns out that he is not a "bloody executioner", but quite the opposite: a smart guy with normal, lively human reactions. It immediately becomes interesting - what's the matter? How many times have they told the world that Beria almost shot great physicists in "packs" and, in any case, threatened to shoot genius scientists through one. But even Felix Shchelkin, who is not very kind to Beria, son


outstanding physicist, Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin, writes in his book Apostles of the Atomic Age that his father said: in the eight years that Beria was in charge of the Atomic Project, not a single employee was arrested in the industry. **No one!** And here are the

colorful

memoirs of Ninel Mikhailovna Epatova, relating to 2014 and published in No. 9 of the Znamya magazine for 2015. In the late 1940s, the author worked at NII-9, and then at Chelyabinsk-40 (Sorokovka) at plutonium plant No. 817 as an engineer and shift supervisor. She writes: "In 1949, when we reached maximum capacity, Kurchatov and Beria arrived. And they came to our laboratory. Beria then was not at all the same as he is portrayed today. All tortured, not getting enough sleep, with red eyes, with bags under his eyes, in a tattered raincoat, not very rich. Work work work. He didn't even look at us beauties. ... The next day he comes - he is lame: he went to bed, and under him the bed net failed. And no one was jailed for it. And then one day they handed over in the socialist city ... the first wooden theater. Everyone gathered: unescorted prisoners, prisoners under escort, engineers, guards, Muzrukov (director of the plant, - **S.K.**) and Beria himself. His driver is dozing, and Beria's tattered raincoat, the same one in which he first came, lies in the car. The celebrations are over, Beria returns to the car, but there is no raincoat. Someone cut it. And no one was jailed either. It seems that he didn't care about anything there, except for work. "



Stadium "Dynamo" them. L.P. Beria in Tbilisi was built in 1936



Lavrenty Beria and Joseph Stalin

Why was the person so slandered, whom does he interfere with even after the grave? Moreover, Beria did not have a coffin, and there is no grave, as there is still no exact date of his death. But somewhere it is recorded - in the most secret, still undisclosed archives, the very fact of the existence of which is officially far from being a fact.

Beria was killed shortly after Stalin's assassination. However, it is not the same year of death that unites Beria and Stalin - they are united by a common huge thirty-year work to create a powerful, democratic Russia. In 1922, when 43-year-old Stalin was first elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), 23-year-old Beria mastered only the first commanding *heights*, but even then he was in the ranks of those who followed Stalin and only Stalin.

The thirty "Stalinist" years were an era of popular victories, even after temporary defeats. In 1946, after the devastating war, people ate rats here and there, and Stalin knew about it. And three years later, the famine was a thing of the past, and in 1949 Russia liquidated the atomic monopoly of America, which threatened the Soviet Union with a sizzling atomic bombing. And in all the great achievements of our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers - and in the fact that the USSR in

a few years after the war, he independently restored the national economy, and in the fact that the USSR ensured its military and economic security in a matter of years, the role and merits of Beria are great. The classic Stalinist "team" was very strong. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Zhdanov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Vyshinsky would do honor to any government of any great power. But even against their background, Beria not only did not get lost, but advanced as Stalin's most talented and successful employee, as his **first lieutenant**. Is it possible to give a person a higher historical assessment? LAVRENTY Beria always went from one

height to an even greater height, from victory to victory. He failed in none of the tasks assigned to him. On the other hand, more than once or twice he pulled out of the "breakthrough" what others failed. In a matter of years, or even months, he dramatically improved the situation in entire industries - not with a stick, not with a carrot, but with the right selection of personnel and faith in the capabilities and abilities of these personnel - from people's commissars to plant directors. And wherever Beria worked, he worked for the benefit and glory of all of Russia.

When Beria cleared the Transcaucasus of counter-revolution and foreign agents, he not only ensured the peace of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Without the Baku oil fields, the security of which was kept by Chekist Beria, the successes of the whole country in the first five-year plans would have been impossible.



Sanatorium "Caucasian Riviera"



Sanatoriums of the resort city of Gagra. 1940

What about Chiatura manganese? The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Beria, did a lot to develop its production, and the all-Union metallurgy, the all-Union economy needed this manganese.

Hundreds of millions of citrus fruits and thousands of tons of Georgian tea were produced in Georgia, developed by Beria, also for the entire Union. Abkhazian tangerines were known in Ukraine, and in Moscow, and in the Urals, and in Siberia ... And is it possible to

forget that the Black Sea coast of Georgia, through the efforts of Beria, became an all-Union health resort by the end of the 1930s, and during the war - one huge hospital ?

Everything that Beria created in Georgia - from new factories to new sanatoriums, closely and inextricably tied Georgia to Russia, made Georgia part of a large country. In this sense, the figure of Beria today directs us to the future, which can be stable for all the peoples that made up the Soviet Union only with their new unification. Beria the winner is diverse, but the conspiracy of silence around his figure was so powerful

and lasted so long that even today only one of the major victories of Beria won by him for Russia is best known - the solution of the Uranium problem in just four years. However, it is practically unknown, for example, that Beria did a lot for our rocket programs. But there was also Beria, a reformer of Georgia... He was also a reformer of the NKVD, and later one of the creators of the Victory, the organizer of the post-war economic and scientific and technological development of the USSR. Finally, there was Beria - "father"

Moscow skyscrapers...

Beria worked hard all his life. He did not fly to the Canary Islands, did not go on cruises, did not drag himself to fashionable ski resorts. He did not have - although he is credited with this over and over again - harems from movie "stars" and top models. But Lavrenty Beria lived an active, exciting life ...

Truly masculine. Stalin foresaw that rubbish and dirt would be put on his grave, but the wind of history will mark everything superficial, and the undisguised truth about those days when, for three decades, Russia under the leadership of

Stalin went from a plow to a hydrogen bomb. And so it happens. But the rising wind of history dispels the debris not only on Stalin's grave. This wind sweeps away the lies about Stalin's comrades-in-arms, about the leaders of the people's victories. This means that the wind of history is also blowing away the lies about Lavrenty Beria. This book about him is another gust of cleansing wind, which should be blown over Russia in all its might.

Information for reflection

Young Beria and his autobiography

TRUE historical portrait of a statesman possible only on the basis of representative archival documents. Alas, the archives of Beria from the Khrushchev era were destroyed with greater brutality than the rest of the archives. Unless the Stalinist archives were destroyed even more brutally and

savagely. The falsification of the meaning of Beria's activities began immediately after his arrest on June 26, 1953 - at the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, held in early July 1953, dedicated to the "exposing" of Beria. As a result, Beria is "documented" much more sparingly than, for example, Kaganovich or Molotov. The documentary truth about Beria has long turned into smoke and ashes in many ways.

Manuscripts are said not to burn. Maybe this is so in relation to literary manuscripts, but historical archives burn for a sweet soul. They burn, among other things, because at certain moments there are more people who want to burn inconvenient documents than save them. Therefore, not much is known about the young years of Beria, and his autobiography is of particular value. Beria wrote it in 1923 - at the age of twenty-four, on an occasion, the essence of which is clarified in the final lines of the document. The literary style of the autobiography is not bad even for a natural hare, and even more so for a young Mingrelian who had lived all his life before that in the Caucasus.

However, Beria learned the Russian language early - at the Sukhumi Higher Primary School, where Lavrenty studied for eight years, graduating with honors, great attention was paid to the Russian language - six hours a week. And the teachers were good. So, Dmitry Gulia taught at the school - the people's poet of Abkhazia, the founder of the Abkhaz fiction and the Abkhaz literary language, who was awarded the Order of Lenin in Soviet times, Gulia was a humanist, and of course, he had only a positive influence on his students ... Since 1905, mathematics, geography, natural science and history were taught by Andrei Maksimovich Chochua - a major Abkhazian

enlightener. Among the Sukhumi teachers of young Lavrenty there were other well-known intellectuals in Abkhazia - Eshba, Dzhanania ... Russians also taught at the school, so it is not surprising that the Russian language of young Beria's autobiography is quite literate and completely free.

WHEN Beria began his studies, Gulia was thirty-three years old - the age of Christ and the first maturity. One can only speculate whether Gulia singled out Lavrentiy from the crowd, but later he paid tribute to him. Volume 13 of the 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, signed for publication exactly one year before Beria's arrest - June 27, 1952, in an article about Dm. Gulia reports that "Gulia dedicated inspirational poems to the great Stalin and his colleague, L.P. Beria"... After the

fall of Beria, this information was also not removed from the TSB-2 and was quietly hidden in the thickness of the encyclopedic volume. It was not easy, it was not easy to erase the name of Beria from Soviet history. Even after the total defamation of Beria became a good political tone in the post-Stalinist USSR, incidents like the one that took place in the encyclopedic article about Dm turned out to be possible. Gulia. As for the

autobiography, everything that Beria wrote in it is, without a doubt, true. After all, everything that he wrote was simple and easy to verify - those who read the lines written by the young Lavrenty were not only witnesses of the events, but also their participants, creators.

Beria obviously wrote his autobiography with great care and diligence, just because he sent it to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, and the result of consideration of the application determined his future fate. And it is clear that the first twenty-four years of Beria's life were so active that even in that turbulent era, such a biography would have been enough for many for the rest of their lives. The young Caucasian occupied in the political hierarchy of Transcaucasia - in any case, in his KGB hierarchy, a position equal to that of a general. But for him, everything done by the autumn of 1923 cannot even be considered as a "launching pad"! Ahead of him were such accomplishments that, in comparison with them, his own biography, as of the end of October 1923, paled and bright, rich.

And Beria wrote this...

“I was born on March 17, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli (15 miles from the city of Sukhum) in a poor peasant family. In view of the fact that my education was a burden to my parents, while still a student of the Sukhumi city school, I prepared elementary school students, thus helping the family, and this continued intermittently until 1915. In 1915, he moved to Baku; From that moment my independent life begins. Since then, while studying at a technical school, I have an old mother, a deaf-mute sister and a niece of 5 years old as dependents. My teaching, which began in

1907 in the city of Sukhum, after completing the course of the higher elementary school (in 1915), with my moving to Baku, continued here and proceeded as follows: having arrived in Baku, I enter here the secondary school of mechanics and construction, where I have been studying for 4 years. In 1919 I completed my course at the school, and in 1920, with the transformation of the technical school into a polytechnic institute, I entered the latter. From that moment on, regular education ceased and my studies at the institute continued intermittently until 1922. However, during all this time I did not lose contact with the institute, and only in 1922, in connection with the transfer of me by the Regional Committee of the RCP from Baku to Tiflis, did I stop teaching , being listed by that time

as a student of the 3rd year. This is how my teaching in Baku, begun in 1915 intermittently continued until 1922”



Before the fire of 1995, the Sukhumi third secondary school was located here, and at the beginning of the century the Sukhumi city school, which Lavrenty Beria graduated from



Dmitry Iosifovich Gulia (1874-1960) - Abkhazian writer, people's poet of Abkhazia (1937). The founder of the Abkhaz written literature.

So, by education, Beria was an architect, having graduated from an educational institution with a reputation as a leading center of technical education in the Caucasus. There were just over 400 students at the Baku School, approximately 100 per course. For comparison, in 1900-1913, 1,360 civil engineers and architects graduated in Russia, also about 100 a year. In other words, Beria, who even received a secondary construction and architectural education, was a member of a very small professional group in Russia, and the level of his training was not low - even regardless of the fact of the undoubted talent of young Lavrenty. At the same time, he could well - with his energy - prepare himself for a prosperous bourgeois career. Pre-revolutionary Baku was very conducive to it - it could be called "Baghdad-on-the-Caspian". It was a cosmopolitan city, and the reason was also the cosmopolitan word "oil". The oil fields of Baku were of interest to both the world's major businessmen and many adventurers, both unfortunate and successful. A variety of self-interested interests clashed here - geopolitical, political, economic, intelligence ...



Sukhumi. Early 20th century



Lavrenty Beria (center) while studying at the school

Who could become in such an atmosphere a clever and capable young man, and even a voluptuous person (of which Beria was so often and so falsely accused), striving for personal success, enrichment and enjoyment of all the blessings of life? He could become a politician, a confidant of the oil "kings" Nobels or Deterding, a sly businessman, a promising employee of one or another large firm, an international agent ...



Street of pre-revolutionary Baku



At Nobil's main office in Balakhna

Beria, brought up in the traditions of hard work, selflessness, caring for the family, responsibility for those for whom he has to be responsible, chose otherwise. His transition to the "red" side of the barricades was quite natural. He himself wrote about it this way:

“In the same year, 1915, my participation in party life began for the first time, then still in its infancy. In October of this year, we, a group of students from the Baku Technical School, organized an illegal Marxist circle, which included students from other educational institutions. The circle existed until February 1917. In this circle I was the treasurer. The motives for creating the circle were: the organization of students, mutual material support and self-education in the Marxist spirit (reading abstracts), analysis of books received from workers' organizations, and so on. At the same time he was elected headman

class (illegal). In March 1917, together with Comrade. V. Egorov, Pukhovich, Avanesov and another comrade (I don't remember my last name) we organize a cell of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks), where I was a member of the bureau.

In 1916 (summer holidays) I served as a trainee at the Nobel headquarters in Balakhny, earning my family and myself a living. In the course of further events, beginning in

1917, in Transcaucasia, I became involved in the general course of party-Soviet work, which throws me from place to place, from the conditions of the legal existence of the party (in 1918 in the city of Baku) to the illegal (1919 1920) and is interrupted by my departure to Georgia. In June 1917, as a trainee technician, I entered the hydraulic engineering organization of the army of the Romanian front and leave with the latter to Odessa, from there to Romania, where I work in the forest detachment of the village of Negulyashty. At the same time, I am elected from the workers and soldiers, chairman of the detachment committee and a delegate from the detachment, I often attend district congresses of representatives of the districts in Pascani (Romania). I remained at this job until the end of 1917 and at the beginning of 1918, upon arrival in Baku, I continued to work at a technical school at an accelerated pace, quickly making up for the missed time. In January 1918, I entered the Baku Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies, working here in the secretariat of the Council as an employee, doing all the current work, and I devote a lot of energy and effort to this work. Here I remain until September 1918, October

this year, it finds me in the liquidation of the commission of councilors, where I remain until the occupation of the city of Baku by the Turks.

The situation in Baku was then motley and, at the same time, muddy. However, Beria did not catch the "goldfish" of dubious luck in the troubled waters of the Caspian Sea, but continued what he had begun:

“During the first period of the Turkish occupation, I worked in the White City behind the Caspian Partnership plant as a clerk. In connection with the beginning of intensive training in

technical school and the need to pass some transitional exams, I was forced to leave the service. From February 1919 to April 1920, being the chairman of the communist cell of technicians, under the guidance of senior comrades, he carried out individual assignments from the district committee, himself working with other cells as an instructor. In the autumn of the same 1919, from the Gummet party (a Muslim organization of the Bolshevik orientation, created even before the revolution on the initiative of Stalin and others - **S.K.**) I entered the counterintelligence service, where I worked together with Comrade Mussevi. Approximately in March 1920, after the assassination of comrade Mussevi, I left my work in counterintelligence and worked for a short time in the Baku customs.

In the spring of 1920, Azerbaijan was Sovietized, and a new stage in Beria's biography begins:

“From the very first days after the April coup in Azerbaijan, the regional committee of the party (Bolsheviks) from the register [Registration (intelligence) department, - **S.K.**] of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army was sent to Georgia for underground work abroad as a representative. In Tiflis, I contact the regional committee in the person of Comrade. Hmayak Nazaretyan, spreading a network of residents in Georgia and Armenia, establishing contact with the headquarters of the Georgian army and guards, regularly sending couriers to the register of the city of Baku. In Tiflis, I was arrested together with the Central Committee of Georgia, but according to the negotiations between G. Sturua and Noah Zhordania, they released everyone with a proposal to leave Georgia within 3 days. However, I managed to stay, having entered under the pseudonym of Lakerbaya in the service of the RSFSR representative office to Comrade Kirov, who by that time had arrived in the city of Tiflis. In May 1920, I went to Baku to the registry office to receive directives in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Georgia, but on the way back to Tiflis I was arrested by a telegram from Noah Ramishvili and taken to Tiflis

sent to Kutaisi prison. June and July, 1920, I am in prison, only after four and a half declared hunger strikes,
days

political prisoners, they send me to Azerbaijan in stages. Upon arrival (August 1920), the Central Committee of the RCP requested me from the army and appointed me as the manager of the affairs of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan. I remained in this position until October 1920, after which I was appointed by the Central Committee Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers. Comrade Sarkis (chairman of the commission) and I carried out this work in shock order until the liquidation of the Commission (February 1921). With the end of my work in the Commission, I manage to persuade the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue my education at the institute, where by that time I was a student (from the day it was opened in 1920). According to my requests, the Central Committee sends me to the institute, giving me a scholarship through the Baku Soviet. However, not even two weeks pass before the Central Committee sends a demand to the Caucasian Bureau to send me to work in Tiflis. As a result, the Central Committee removes me from the institute, but instead of sending me to Tiflis, by its decree, appoints me to the Azerbaijan Cheka as deputy head of the secret operations department (April 1921) and soon - head of the secret operations department - deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka " .



Hmayak Markarovitch Nazaretyan (1889–1937). Soviet statesman and party figure. Member of the RCP(b) since 1905. Member of the struggle for Soviet power in the Caucasus.

Life went on in all its revolutionary complexity, which
It can be seen from what Beria wrote further:

“I will not dwell on the tense and nervous nature of work in the Azerbaijani Cheka. As a result, such positive results soon affected. Stopping here on the defeat of the Muslim organization "Ittihat",

which has tens of thousands of members. Next - the defeat of the Transcaucasian organization of the Right Social Revolutionaries, for which the GPU (VChK), by its order of February 6, 1923, No. 45, announces gratitude to me with the award of weapons. The results of the same work were noted by the Council of People's Commissars of the ASSR in their commendation list of September 12, 1922, and in the local press. Working in the Azerbaijan Cheka, at the same time I am the chairman of the Azmezhkom (Azerbaijan Interdepartmental Commission) from VII-1921 to XI-1922. Then in the commission of the Supreme Economic Council (Supreme Economic Council) and in the commission for the inspection of the Revolutionary Tribunal. On the party line, I am attached from the BK AKP to the working cells, and later, for convenience, to the cell of the Cheka, where I am a member of the bureau, I have been elected to almost all congresses and conferences of the AKP, I was also a member of the Baku Council. In November 1922, I was recalled by the Transcaucasian Regional Committee from the Azerbaijan Cheka to the disposal of the Central Committee of the KKE, which appointed me head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia. Here, taking into account the seriousness of the work and the large object, I devote all my knowledge and time to it, as a result, in a relatively short time, it is possible to achieve serious results that affect all branches of work: such is the elimination of banditry, which had assumed grandiose proportions in Georgia, and the defeat of the Menshevik organization and the anti-Soviet party in general, despite the extraordinary results of the work achieved, were noted by the Central Committee and the Central Executive Committee of Georgia in the form of awarding me with the Order of the Red Banner. In Georgia, while working in the Cheka, I am also a member of the bureau of the communist cell and a member of the Tiflis Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The Chekist line in the life of Beria was determined, it seems, quite unambiguously, but Lavrenty wants to take a different path and ends with the following words:

During my party and Soviet work, especially in the organs of the Cheka, I lagged far behind both in terms of general development,

without finishing his special education. Having a vocation for this branch of knowledge, having spent a lot of time and effort, I would ask the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue this education in order to complete it as soon as possible. Completed special education will give me the opportunity to give my experience and knowledge in this area to Soviet construction, and the party - to use me as it sees fit. 1923 22/X (signed)"

Such is the biography in the interior of the era.



Nina Gegechkori - wife of Lavrenty Beria

PUBLISHERS of Beria's autobiography in the 1991 anti-Beria collection of Politizdat "Beria: the end of a career" rated it dirty: "Show-off, self-praise, exaltation of trifles to large scales - this is apparently a trait of character that, due to circumstances, has received a menacing development for others." But what self-praise! Especially - taking into account what

the author asked the senior comrades in the party. According to the apt definition of Yuri Mukhin, who also analyzed Beria's text, he asked "from generals to students." Only a morally sound person is capable, occupying a very high position in the state hierarchy, to ask again for a student's bench. Of course, in the 1920s they lived modestly. Chekists, even leading ones - including Beria also lived modestly. But the students did not live more satisfyingly, and Beria already had a family. Little so far - he and Nino's wife, but the family.

By the age of 24, Chekist Beria had achieved a steady growth prospect, but was ready to risk his success for the sake of an uncertain fate ... Becoming a civil engineer, Beria could find a bright fate in that turbulent time in a new field. But he could have gotten lost. So why did Beria ask to be let go to study? For a normal person, the answer is obvious: Beria was a builder by nature, a creator, and wanted to become one - a builder and creator, by profession. The aspirations of the young Beria prove that all accusations of his alleged careerism are also nonsense!

If he were a careerist, he would hold his teeth, albeit a tough, but "leading" chair in the Cheka. And he didn't hold on to it. The aspirations of the young Beria reveal his confidence in

in their power. He is not afraid to abruptly leave for an unknown coil of fate.

No, Beria's early autobiography is certainly a vivid and convincing document of the era. Is it possible to understand a person without knowing how and on what basis he was formed? The origins of the present and the future go into the past. And Beria's early past shows him - if you look objectively - from the best side, as a person focused on results.

And so it went on: year after year, three decades in a row -
from one victory to another.

First victory 1921–1931. Chekist of Transcaucasia No. 1

ALREADY in the early Caucasian period of his activity - when he was still catching bandits and fighting agents of Georgian emigration, Lavrenty Beria worked for the entire Soviet Union. The Caucasus was the most important region - primarily because of oil, and in a sense, Beria's Chekist activities in the Transcaucasus can be defined as a struggle for oil for Russia. Especially Beria unfolded already in Tiflis, but also smelling of oil, international Baku became for Beria a bright page in his biography. Mir Jafar Baghirov

(1896-1956), who was born three years earlier than Beria and was shot in Baku three years after Beria's assassination, was then the chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka. It is sometimes argued that at first Bagirov patronized Beria, and only then, when Beria "grew up" a lot, Bagirov became "Beria's man." Such statements look primitive, but it is possible that Beria got into the AzChK thanks to Bagirov. In 1920, he was deputy chairman of the Military Tribunal of the 11th Army of the Caucasian Front, and Beria worked in the Registration, that is, the intelligence department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army. And, of course, Bagirov could not help but like Beria, as evidenced by the imminent promotion of Beria. Nevertheless, a year and a half later - from November 1922, the head of the Secret Operational Unit and deputy chairman of the AzChK L.P. Beria is transferred to the same position in the GruzChK, in Tiflis. Why Bagirov

gave way to an intelligent worker of the Georgian Cheka? Is it because he saw in Beria a dangerous rival, capable of getting around the boss? Don't think! Even taking into account Bagirov's inclination to intrigue, the transfer was explained by objective reasons, although the motivation for the transfer was precisely the activity and intelligence of Beria. The operational situation in Azerbaijan was not easy, but in Georgia it was completely bad. Suffice it to say that even when throughout the USSR the bodies of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission were transformed into bodies of the United State Political Administration (OGPU), in Georgia

It was the **Extraordinary** Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution that continued its work .

BERIA left Baku forever, and how he worked in Azerbaijan can be understood - except from his autobiography, from two more documents. Here is the first one:

***"Azerbaijan Socialist
Soviet Republic
Azerbaijan Council of
People's Commissars***

Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars in commemoration of the execution by the head of the secret operational department of the Azerbaijan Extraordinary Commission comrade. Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich of his duty to the proletarian revolution, expressed in the skillful leadership of the work brilliantly carried out on a state scale to liquidate the Transcaucasian organization of the P. S.-R. (Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, - **S.K.**) rewards him with a gold watch with a monogram.

Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars
G. Musabegov

Here is the second one:

**"Extract from the order of the
GPU of 1923 No. 45**

For the energetic and skillful carrying out of the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization of the p. s.-r. early s.o.h. Baku Provincial Department comrade. Beria and early secret department comrade. Yossem are awarded weapons - Browning revolvers with inscriptions about what to put on their track records ...

Deputy Chairman of the GPU (*Unshlikht*)"

Documentary evidence that positively characterizes Beria has long turned into archival rarities, but something remains. For example, the "Certificate", signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Akhundov, has been preserved, which said:

"This is given to the responsible party worker comrade. Beria L.P. in the fact that he [possesses] outstanding abilities, manifested in various apparatuses of the state mechanism ... Working as the Manager of the Central Committee of Az. of the Communist Party, the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Registrar of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army and the Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers, he, with his inherent energy, perseverance, completed all the tasks assigned by the party, giving brilliant results with his versatile work, which should be noted as the best, valuable, tireless worker, so necessary at the present moment in Soviet construction ...

"

The certificate was given in 1923, when Beria was already working in Georgia. Now it is impossible to say for sure - why did Beria, who works in Georgia, need a reference from Azerbaijan? Perhaps Beria, seeking to leave the Cheka to study, needed confirmation that he would be useful in party or Soviet work. We also have an assessment of Beria - as a Chekist - by Kirov. Sergei

Mironovich Kirov was then the secretary of the Central Committee in Baku and wrote: "... comrade. Beria is a good and energetic Chekist, he showed himself in the Chekist work on a good side.

SO, Beria was escorted to a new job with honors. On the eve of the transfer, he was marked with a commendation list of the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR, local newspapers wrote about him. But this is in Baku, where young Beria managed to become the Chekist No. 2 of Azerbaijan. IN

Tiflis, where he was to eventually become Chekist No. 1 of the entire Transcaucasus, even more intense and nervous work awaited him.

On March 12, 1922, at a conference of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Transcaucasian Federation was established - a federative union of the three Soviet republics of Transcaucasia. On December 13, 1922, at the 1st Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in Baku, the Federation was transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic with its capital in Tiflis, and on December 30, 1922, the ZSFSR merged with the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR into a single union state - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In Transcaucasia, the restoration of the destroyed and the construction of new.

Economic construction had to be protected from sabotage and sabotage, but the calmer it became in Transcaucasia, the more difficult was the work to ensure this calmness. Georgia was the most difficult republic for the Chekists. To begin with, Soviet power was established there last. The Azerbaijan SSR was formed on April 28, 1920, the Armenian SSR on November 29, 1920, and the Georgian SSR only on February 25, 1921. At the same time, the Mensheviks were traditionally strong in Georgia. Before the revolution, there were many more of them in the republic than Bolsheviks. The Georgian Mensheviks had extensive Russian and European connections within Russia, and this was also a Georgian peculiarity. The Azerbaijani nationalist party "Musavat" (Equality) was founded in Baku in 1911 and its activity

was limited to the Caucasus. The Armenian "Dashnaktsutyun" ("Union") was formed even earlier - in 1890, by the way - in Tiflis (in Tiflis at the beginning of the 20th century there were more Armenians than Georgians). But the Dashnaks also limited their activities to the Caucasian region. And the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks Noi Zhordania, Akaki Tsereteli, Karlo Chkheidze were also leaders of the all-Russian Menshevik wing of the RSDLP. Bolshevik Stalin in 1907 called them "our Caucasian clowns."

From 1918 to 1921, Zhordania headed the Menshevik government of Georgia, and now he was in exile, and he wanted only one thing for Soviet Georgia - death, like his supporters in Georgia itself. Death

they carried: during the evacuation to Turkey, the government of Jordania removed from Georgia the entire supply of quinine, then an indispensable remedy against malaria. And malaria, before the malaria swamps were drained under Beria, was

the scourge of Georgians. The emigrant ties of the Georgian Mensheviks, as parties with all-Russian potential, were the most significant and extensive. However, the Dashnaks in Transcaucasia were also strong, because there was a strong and influential Armenian diaspora in the world, the oil "king" Gulbenkian was an Armenian ...

ONE prepared conspiracies behind the cordon, others tried to implement out-of-cord directives in mutinies and uprisings, not neglecting either sabotage, or sabotage, or espionage in favor of the West.



Noy Nikolaevich Zhordania (1869–1953) - Russian and Georgian politician, Chairman of the Government of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918–1921)



Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian (1869–1955) was a British financier, industrialist and philanthropist, a major oil tycoon in the first half of the 20th century. Co-founder of many oil companies. Founder of the "Iraq Petroleum Company", who laid the foundation for oil production in the Middle East

Since gangsterism of all sorts was developed, Beria actively joined the fight against it, and in 1923, the first year of Lavrenty's work in the GruzChK, out of 31 gangs established by the Chekists on the territory of Georgia, 21 were liquidated. During the fighting, 123 bandits were destroyed, 377 were captured alive.

Dashnaks turned out to be a separate concern. Beria knew this public well from Baku, and acted against it with knowledge of its weaknesses. At the beginning of 1923, the main backbone of the Dashnak activists in Georgia, including the entire composition of the Tiflis Committee, was arrested. 11 machine guns, 33 boxes of grenades, 70 rifles, 30 bags of artillery powder, 70 dynamite plates, 500 pounds of cartridges were seized from a secret

warehouse in Akhaltsikhe ... But the Georgian counter-revolutionaries remained the main pain. Their mass base was undermined by the actions of the Soviet government in favor of the working majority. From August 25 to August 30, 1923, a congress of Georgian Mensheviks was legally held in Tbilisi, the delegates of which represented 11,235 members of the party. The congress announced the liquidation of the party, but even before that, about 17 thousand workers and peasants left it. Approximately 2,000 people remained on the side of the former Central Committee of the Mensheviks, mainly from noble and bourgeois circles. And abroad, a "Georgian government in exile" was formed, headed by Noah Zhordania, Noah Ramishvili and Irakli Tsereteli. In Georgia, representatives of the five parties that went underground—the Social Democrats (Mensheviks), National Democrats, the Socialist Federalists, the Independent the Social Democrats, and the Socialist Revolutionaries—concluded an agreement to establish an "Independence Committee"—"parity." The "paritetchiks" were led by a member of the Central Committee of the Georgian Menshevik Party, former Minister of Agriculture Noy Khomeriki, who had arrived from behind the cordon. An uprising was being prepared in Georgia.

And Beria carried out a brilliant operation, which became known as the "case of parity". In 1924, Khomeriki, members of the Menshevik Central Committee Chkhikishvili, Nodia were arrested ... Chkhikishvili was found to have a letter from Noah Zhordania. He instructed the "fighters" like this: ***"The Russian tsars fought only with Dagestan for more than 30 years. It is easy to imagine how many years the Bolsheviks will need to fight not only Dagestan, but the whole Transcaucasus. The transfer of a military base to the Caucasus Range and the strengthening of all our armed forces there is a guarantee of our victory. Only in this case will Europe pay serious attention to us and provide assistance."*** And on August 6, 1924, the GruzChK arrested the emissary of Zhordania - Valiko Dzhugeli. He was to supervise the direct preparation

uprisings. By that time, the Georgian Chekists had detailed information about the activities of the “Independence Committee”.



Valiko Dzhugeli (1887–1924), Georgian politician and military figure

What would a careerist do if he had most of the threads of the conspiracy in his hands? The best way to curry favor is to start arrests, regardless of the scale of losses, both others and yours. And the greater the losses, the more weight can be given to victory. Beria behaved in exactly the opposite way. He let Dzhugeli make sure that the Cheka knew everything even without his confessions. And then Dzhugeli was asked to apply

from the conclusion to the leaders of the upcoming speech with a recommendation to abandon - as he was convinced - the adventure. Jugheli did just that - he did not

want wasted blood. But

Beria did not want her either! Dzhugeli's letter was published in Soviet Georgian newspapers, and this is what he wrote: ***"I experienced for myself ... the influence of the air of the Cheka, and I realized that the whole strength of this air lies in the fact that it is here that you get to know the reverse side of our work, with all its dark sides."***

Jugheli stated that it was not cowardice and cowardice that led him to give up the fight, but the hopelessness of the planned enterprise. But it was necessary to be able to prove it to Dzhugeli. Beria managed, and it was in his style, to try to influence even the enemy with the power of persuasion and logic. And only if the enemy did not break, he had to be destroyed.

A widespread uprising was thwarted, but on August 28, 1924, a group of Prince George Tsereteli captured Chiatura and formed the "Provisional Government of Georgia". There were minor performances in Senak, Seberinsky, Zugdidi, Dusheti districts, in Guria ... By August 31, 1924, everything was completed with the support of the population itself. In Adjara, 1,500 peasants came to strengthen the protection of the border with Turkey. On September 4, 1924, employees of the GruzChK tracked down and arrested the main composition of the "Parity Committee" headed by Prince Kote Andronikashvili. The

organizers of the uprising, among whom were 17 princes, were shot, but, as often happens, the liquidation of the "head" of the conspiracy did not eliminate all its participants. The struggle did not stop, it just changed. And her hidden from prying eyes character only complicated the situation.

Another "front" began to form - among the Caucasian Bolsheviks themselves. The idea of the Federation was opposed not only by bourgeois nationalists, but also by a number of national Bolshevik leaders. Mdivani, Dumbadze, Kavtaradze, Okudzhava, Tsintsadze in Georgia, Akhundov, Huseynov, Khanbudagov in Azerbaijan believed that each republic should maintain its own army, have its own currency, enjoy freedom of foreign trade and enjoy party autonomy from the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Caucasian Bureau Central Committee.



Leaders of the August (1924) uprising in Georgia



Military detachment and residents of Manglesia after the suppression of the anti-Soviet uprising. August 1924

In November 1922, the conflict became so acute that the secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee, Ordzhonikidze, under Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, who arrived in Tiflis, slapped one of Mdivani's supporters. And just in November 1922, Beria appears in Tiflis - in the midst of a fight (even in the literal sense of the word) between real Leninists and "Leninists" in quotation marks. Taking the side of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, on this alone Lavrenty Beria immediately earned himself a lot of not only enemies, but mortal enemies! For example, Tsintsadze, personally known to Lenin, was a Bolshevik since 1904, under the tsar he worked with Mdivani in Kutais, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku. After the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, a member of the Central Executive Committee of Georgia and ... the chairman of the GruzChK. At the same time, he was a supporter of Trotsky. That is, the Trotskyist Tsintsadze (in 1927 he was expelled from the party precisely for this) for some time was the direct superior of Beria!

Almost all of the above "old Bolsheviks" were repressed in 1937-38, and then, in the 1920s, their political degradation was just beginning. Nevertheless, for the Chekist Beria, this became another, and very delicate, concern. A blow could now be expected not only from the "right", but also from the "left", not only from below - from the underground, but also "from above" - from the leadership. Beria knew

how to work effectively, and such people make enemies regardless of whether they want to have them or not. Beria also gradually made enemies, but he also had defenders. The 1st secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Myasnikov (Myasnikyan), who died in 1925 in a plane crash, was a very intelligent manager, managed to leave the following description:

"Beria is an intellectual. He declared himself in Baku as a capable security officer in the post of deputy chairman of the Cheka of Azerbaijan and head of the secret operational unit. Now the beginning SOC Georgian Cheka"

We also have at our disposal a later characterization given to Beria by his former boss Ivan Pavlunovsky (1888–1940), a party member since 1905. Pavlunovsky ended, however, badly - being one of Ordzhonikidze's closest employees in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, he contacted the Trotskyists and in October 1937 he was shot.



Grigory Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze (party nickname Sergo) (1886-1937) - a famous Bolshevik of Georgian origin and a prominent Soviet statesman and party leader, revolutionary



Alexander Fedorovich Myasnikov (1886-1925) - revolutionary, party and statesman, one of the leaders in the establishment of Soviet power in Belarus. Author of a number of works on the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the history of the revolutionary movement and Armenian literature



Ivan Petrovich Pavlunovsky (1888-1937) - Soviet politician, revolutionary, high-ranking officer of the Soviet special services

On September 7, 1926, by order of the OGPU No. 190, Pavlunovsky was approved as the Chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the ZSFSR. And almost ten years later, on June 25, 1937, he (apparently, at the request of Stalin) wrote the following letter: (spelling and syntax preserved):

"To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin

About Comrade Beria

In 1936 (the original was a typo, in fact it was 1926 - **S.K.**) I was appointed in Transcaucasia the Chairman of the Zak GPU.

Before leaving for Tiflis, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the head of the OGPU, summoned me to his place (this was clearly on the eve of the death of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who died on July 20, 1926 - **S.K.**) and acquainted me in detail with the situation in Transcaucasia. Comrade Dzerzhinsky immediately informed me that one of my assistants in the Transcaucasus, Comrade Beria, worked with the Mussovatists in the Mussovatist counter-intelligence. Let this circumstance in no way embarrass me or put me on guard against comrade Beria, since comrade Beria worked in counter-intelligence with the knowledge of the responsible comrades. Transcaucasians and what does he, comrade Dzerzhinsky and comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze, know about it. Upon arrival in Tiflis ... I ... went to comrade

Sergo (then the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee - S.K.) ... T. Sergo Ordzhonikidze told me that indeed comrade Beria ... carried out this work on behalf of the party workers and what about this is well known to him, comrade Ordzhonikidze, comrade Kirov, comrade Mikoyan and comrade Nazaretyan. Therefore, I must treat Comrade Beria with full confidence, and that he ... completely trusts Comrade Beria. During the two years of work in Transcaucasia, Comrade Ordzhonikidze told me several

times that he highly appreciated Comrade Beria as a growing worker, that Comrade Beria would develop into a big worker and that he, Sergo, reported such a description of Comrade Beria, etc. Stalin.

<...>

About two years ago, Comrade Sergo once told me in a conversation, but you know that right-wing deviators and other riffraff are trying to use the fact that he worked in Mussovat counter-intelligence in the fight against Beria, but nothing will come of it . I asked Comrade Sergo if Comrade Stalin knew

about this. Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze replied that Comrade Stalin knew about this and that he, too, had spoken to Comrade Stalin about it.

June 25, 1937"

However, various riff-raff acted against Beria not only in words. In the autumn of 1925, Beria, with a group of Chekists in two cars, was returning along the Georgian Military Highway to Tiflis. An ambush awaited them at the mountain pass.

Beria was driving the first car. One Chekist was killed, two were wounded. But Beria - this is not my assessment - "did not lose his presence of mind" and, shooting back, covered the rest.

FROM DECEMBER 2, 1926, Beria's activities begin to cover the entire Transcaucasus - he is appointed deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the ZSFSR and deputy chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU, while also remaining head of the Secret Operations Department of the OGPU plenipotentiary in the ZSFSR.

In November 1928, the post of chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU was taken by Stanislav Redens, a member of the party since 1914. He replaced Pavlunovsky. Redens was an experienced security officer, but he did not know the specifics of the Caucasus, and with the formal superiority of Redens, Beria remained the "workhorse" of the Transcaucasian GPU. With

the beginning of collectivization, the reaction of the Caucasian peasantry to excesses in agriculture turned out to be a painful problem. On August 17, 1931, Stalin wrote from the south to Kaganovich in Moscow:

"... Now it is clear to me that Kartvelishvili (until 1929 - the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, in 1929-31 - the 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the head of the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Military District, and since 1931 - the 1st secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee - **S.K.)** and Gruzdek's secretariat, with their reckless "grain procurement policy" brought a number of regions of Western Georgia to starvation. ... Hundreds of people are being arrested, including party members who clearly sympathize with the discontented and do not sympathize with the "politics" of the Georgian Central Committee. But arrests won't get you far."

Mass unrest was programmed by the "politics" of the Georgian "politicians", and the Chekists had to take the rap. On March 11, 1930, Redens and Beria reported to the First Deputy Chairman of the OGPU

G.G. Yagoda on a direct wire: ***“As a result of ... the excesses made, intra-kolkhoz shortcomings and the general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak forces, mass anti-kolkhoz demonstrations that take on political overtones have intensified, a number of districts are engulfed in fermentation ... There is a rapid disintegration of collective farms, accompanied in some cases by the defeat of the Village Councils, beating and expulsion Party Komsomol members and Soviet activists.*”**



Peasants plow the land. 1931
Photo by William Osgood Field



Georgia. 1931
Photo by William Osgood Field



On the Georgian military road. 1931
Photo by William Osgood Field



Zugdidi. Street scene.

Photo by William Osgood Field. 1931

Gangs were again formed in mountainous Georgia. And Redens and Beria requested the Center's sanctions for more vigorous action - when a fire broke out, it had to be extinguished. But it was the then political leadership of Georgia that kindled the fire. The "old" "Bolsheviks" also bred internal squabbles. Beria was tired of all this worse than a bitter radish - it was not for them to glue broken pots. And on May 13, 1930, he wrote to Ordzhonikidze:

“Dear Sergo, more than once I have raised the question of my studies before you. Time passes, around people grow, develop, and those who were far from me yesterday, today have gone ahead. I know that I am way behind. Indeed, with our Chekist work, we often do not even have time to read a newspaper, let alone engage in self-education ...

Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to bring up the subject of education. But what to do ... I feel that I can no longer ... ”

Perhaps, when he wrote these lines, Beria was also thinking about a blonde with blue eyes - Nino's wife, who graduated from the economic department of the university, was preparing a dissertation. From Lavrenty in 1930, all this was as far away as in 1923 ... Beria went to the thirty-second year, he was the chairman of the GPU of Georgia and the deputy chairman of the GPU of the Transcaucasian SFSR. And, even occupying such positions, he wanted to learn. There were also such lines in the

May letter:

"I have carefully considered everything. My departure at work will not be reflected. The apparatus of the Georgian [GPU] GPU is well-organized and works so well that any comrade who heads it after me will cope with the situation.

The apparatus of the Azerbaijani GPU in the center is also well established. The apparatus of the Armenian GPU is now also being strengthened. Tov. Redens is already sufficiently oriented in our environment and can freely cope with his work ... "

And here is another passage from that long May letter:

"I think that my departure from the Transcaucasus will even serve the best. After all, during ten years of work in the organs of the GPU in the conditions of the Transcaucasus, I had enough of an eyesore not only to all anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements, but also to some of our comrades. How many people will directly welcome my departure, so I have become boring to them with my constant ... revealing the existing shortcomings. They wanted everything to be covered up, and here, if you please, rejoice, there are flaws and blunders all around ...

I feel like I'm definitely tired of everyone. They are already working on it, but I don't know what will happen next. All the stories that have ever been in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus in general are beginning to be associated with me ... In the minds of many comrades, I am the root cause of all the troubles that have befallen my comrades in recent times and appear almost as an informer. Is it possible to work in such conditions

and will there be any
no use for this work? I think not..."

A comprehensive assessment of the situation and leadership "on the ground" was part of the direct official duties of the Plenipotentiary of the OGPU of Transcaucasia - the Chekists played the role of an objective "sovereign's eye" in the system of Soviet power. And Lavrenty Beria never neglected his duties. And he didn't let others do it either. They are not very liked in most bosses' offices. It happens differently only when the owner of the office himself is an active leader, whose main "hobby" is his business, which takes up twenty-four hours a day, and not the prescribed "attendance" hours.



Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky (1874-1934) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet party leader, one of the leaders of the Soviet state security agencies, successor to F. E. Dzerzhinsky at the head of the OGPU (1926-1934)

Bearing in mind the letter dated May 13, 1930, we note its characteristic feature: Beria did not specifically blame anyone, although objectively there were enough reasons for this. Nevertheless, Beria only "urgently" asks to be taken from the Transcaucasus, and "if it's impossible to send him to study, then at least transfer him to another job in some region of the

USSR" ... This also characterizes a person. And characterizes with dignity.

In MAY 1931, Redens was transferred to Belarus, and thirty-two-year-old Lavrenty Beria was appointed the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the TSFSR - chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU. On August 5, 1931, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved him as a member of the collegium of the OGPU. Even before that, on March 30, 1931, the order of the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky No. 154/93 was issued:

"March 30, 1931

Secret

Gor. Moscow

March 21 marked the 10th anniversary of the existence and heroic struggle of the Georgian GPU...

The work of the GPU of Georgia was difficult, many glorious fighters were put out of action, but the achievements are enormous: the Menshevik Party of Georgia, one of the most powerful and organized anti-Soviet parties in the USSR, was crushed, dozens of the composition of its Central Committee, hundreds of local committees, thousands of active members; lines of communication were smashed, and as a result the 80,000-strong Menshevik Party, which had the support of the interventionists and the entire 2nd International, was reduced to the position of a miserable

group of counter-revolutionaries exposed to the working masses. Also, the large anti-Soviet bourgeois parties of the national

Democrats and Socialist-Federalists.
Defeated banditry ... "

But who provided it in the first place? Well, in this regard, the order was expressed clearly and unambiguously:

"The Board of the OGPU notes with particular satisfaction that all this enormous hard work has been basically done by our own national cadres, brought up, educated and tempered in the fire of combat work, under the permanent leadership of Comrade. Beria - who managed with exceptional instinct, always to clearly navigate and, in the most difficult circumstances, politically correctly solving the tasks set, ... at the same time, infect employees with personal example and, passing them his organizational and operational skills, educate them in unconditional devotion to the Communist Party and its Central Committee...

Chairman of the OGPU ***V. Menzhinsky***

It was a recognition - a clear, recorded in the lines of an official document, the recognition of Beria's first major victory, his recognition as Chekist of Transcaucasia No. 1.

Second victory

1920s-1930s. Oil for socialism

Inseparable from the victories of the young Beria as a Chekist was his second major victory - in the struggle for the oil of the Soviet Transcaucasus. Before the revolution and in the first years of Soviet power, the general industrial development of the Caucasus was weak, but in one branch of the economy the importance of the Caucasus was recognized as key. Baku's oil turned out to be the main wealth - even before the war, the Baku oil fields provided up to 75 percent of the all-Union oil production, and this is not counting the oil refineries of Transcaucasia! ..

For ten of his "Caucasian" years, Beria was a "pure" Chekist. People of the "invisible front" do not advertise themselves, but, on the contrary, try not to be seen. And such a victory of the Caucasian Chekists under the leadership of Beria as the safety of the Baku oil fields and oil refining remained out of public attention and recognition. Ensuring operational peace in the interests of oil inside the Transcaucasus, the most important strategic region of the USSR, was not an easy task and not a one-time task. The struggle for oil for socialism at different times took on a different character in the Caucasus - sometimes oil as such receded into the background and even the third plan. However, oil has always been present among the problems solved by Chekist Beria, already because the opposite side: the secret services of the West, white and nationalist emigration, Western politicians and businessmen, also considered the problem of Caucasian oil as the most important and most important.



Henry Wilhelm August Deterding (1866–1939) was a Dutch entrepreneur, the largest oil industrialist, who for 36 years led the Royal Dutch and Royal Dutch Shell corporations. One of the richest men of his time. Active anti-communist, sponsor of ultra-right political forces, financier of the NSDAP. Photo from 1936



British soldiers on their way to Baku. 1918

Beria did not work directly in Azerbaijan for long, but in Baku he could go and went through a good school as a counterintelligence officer, at the same time getting acquainted with the craft of intelligence. Baku had all the possibilities for that. It is unlikely that another such knot of various secret interests was found in the USSR - both the political interests of different powers, and the specific interests of their special services. Interests were closed,

ultimately, on oil. Baku oil was owned before the Nobel revolution, owned by the famous international oil tycoon Deterding, the founder of the Shell oil empire ... Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York, Gulf and Francaise Companies were drawn to Baku oil "... The local magnates Mantashevs and the Armenian-Turkish oil "king" Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkyan had their own "barrel of oil" in Baku. Caucasian oil was

coveted by Germany, Turkey, even Poland, not to mention the British Empire and the United States. All the main interventionist efforts in the Caucasus were made precisely because of oil - even the manganese of the Georgian Chiatura was not so varnish for the world imperialist vultures. A good idea of what the anti-Soviet

Transcaucasia was politically is given by diary entries from 1920

the year of the sailor Ivan Isakov, who had a keen eye, a sensible head, and a good pen. He wrote: "... it is characteristic ... that the Turkish pasha, the British generals and Sir Deterding, the Swede Nobel, the French Jew Rothschild and those native Baku residents like Assadulayev, Tagiev, Mantashev, Lalayev and others "care" about the national interests of the Azerbaijani people most of all. who spend most of the year in Paris and raise their children there."



"Comrade Zinoviev delivers a speech at the grave of 26 Baku commissars." Baku. 1920



Lazar Fedorovich Bicherakhov (1882-1952) - officer of the Russian Imperial Army, participant in the First World War and the Civil War

All this powerful pack was not inclined to give oil to Baku to the new, Soviet Russia. Moreover, it was most convenient to act in the Caucasus through the nationalists. Those had hands, connections, knowledge of local conditions, the oil magnates had money. Therefore, even if the Caucasian Chekists uncovered outwardly purely nationalist conspiracies, then on the scale of a large country it was still a battle for oil. After all, in the event of coming to power as a result of a successful anti-Soviet coup, there would be nothing to pay the nationalists with their "sponsors" except for oil.

Without dwelling in detail on the Transcaucasian tangle of political vipers, one can, nevertheless, say that this tangle was dangerous, experienced and well-deserved. And problems were intertwined in Baku

throughout the Caspian region. On both sides of the Caspian there were enough potential "clients" of the Chekists - one Right Socialist-Revolutionary Funtikov was worth something! It was he who took the "technical" side of the murder of 26 Baku commissars, who were shot in September 1918 by order of the British interventionists. Even earlier, in July 1918, Funtikov, together with the cadets (Count Dorrer), Turkmen nationalists, officers of the Teke cavalry units and others, raised the Askhabad rebellion. Then - on the night of July 23, 1918, between the stations of Annau and Gyaurs, 18 kilometers from Ashgabat, 9 Ashgabat commissars

were shot. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries prepared the fall of the Baku Commune together with the Mensheviks, and at the same time they mellowed warmly with both the Musavatists and the British, who were represented by Major General Dunsterville. Later, the general spoke frankly about how he recruited Colonel Lazar Bicherakhov of the Terek Cossack army, who commanded a detachment of Terek Cossacks in one and a half thousand sabers. Dunsterville wrote: ***"Bicherakhov decided to become a Bolshevik... He telegraphed this to the Bolshevik Committee, frankly admitting that only Soviet power... can save Russia"***

... sincere" colonel opened the front to the Turks and went to Dagestan. On July 31, Soviet power in Baku fell, on August 4, the Right Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Armenian Dashnaks, strong in Baku, formed the so-called Dictatorship of the Central Caspian, and on August 4 a small group of British entered Baku. On August 17, General Dunsterville also showed up with the main forces. Bicherakhov was awarded two high British orders and received the rank of general of the English army - he later fled to England. There was also such a Transcaucasian character as the brother of Colonel Bicherakhov Georgy Bicherakhov,

engineer, Menshevik, organizer of the anti-Soviet revolt of the prosperous Terek Cossacks and the mountain elite in the summer and autumn of 1918. This dangerous rebellion is known in history under the name "Biccherahovshchina". He was inspired by the British mission in Vladikavkaz, associated with Denikin.

One, as they say, to one!

Dunsterville led the preparations for the overthrow of the Baku Commune from Persia. In his memoirs, he did not hide the fact that communication with Baku **"was established through almost daily couriers"**, and that **"our friends, the social revolutionaries, were able ... to establish a new form of government in Baku and invite the British to help."** The general was frank: **"I have repeatedly negotiated with representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the program of which is much more in line with our goals ..."**

The goals of the British corresponded, however, to the program not only of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Musavatists, Dashnaks, pan-Islamists from Ittihad-islam, radical mountain nationalists, political bandits and just bandits - they all suited not only the British, but also the Turks, Germans, Poles, Americans, just because this motley riffraff was hostile to the Bolsheviks. With all the mutual quarrels and disagreements, they were similar in two main points: in their hatred of the Soviets and in their readiness to sell to anyone, subject to payment in hard currency.

AFTER the establishment of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, the leading masters of conspiracies and rebellions went into exile, but they did not stop subversive work, and it was carried out by local "cadres" who had gone underground. Someone legalized, allegedly repentant, but often the "frankness" of the recognition of Soviet power was, alas, of the "Biccherakh" type. Beria devoted a lot of energy to

the fight against such an "audience" - at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the economic counter-revolution became for him, as well as for all Soviet Chekists in general, an object of constant attention. In 1928, Beria's colleagues uncovered the "Shakhty case" - by no means invented by the OGPU, like the case of the "Industrial Party" in 1930. The "Transcaucasian" "highlight of the program" was sabotage in the oil industry. Opposition to him occupied an important place in Beria's Chekist activities.

place.

Oil is the blood of the economy.
Here the enemy hit on oil.

In 1929, Beria began an investigation into the case of wrecking and sabotage in the Azneft trust. Azneft is the State Association of the Azerbaijan Oil Industry, established on the basis of a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 10, 1924 and directly subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR. Azneft included six fields, three groups of oil refineries, two power plants, a number of auxiliary enterprises, its own railway lines, rail, road and sea transport. Before the revolution, all this was scattered among almost two hundred owners, and on May 28, 1920, it was nationalized. So there were enough people in the Transcaucasus and beyond the cordon who wanted to either "privatize" huge material values again, or, if it didn't succeed, at least harm "these Bolsheviks". The maximum production level reached in the Baku region before the revolution was approximately 10 million tons per year. By the end of the 1920s, Azneft again

reached this level, but slowly. The reasons were not so much technical as political. Working on the Azneft case, Beria wrote to Ordzhonikidze in Moscow on September 1, 1929:

"... тов. Реденс recently returned from vacation, but I decided not to go on vacation yet, but to go to Baku. It is necessary to press hard on this oil business and not allow it to take on a protracted character, as was observed in relation to the "Shakhty case", etc. All the more so that Comrade. Soso (Stalin - **S.K.**) in a conversation with Comrade. Реденс... expressed doubts whether we could handle it ourselves... I'll stay there for a month, and if necessary, even more, but I'll finish the job and reveal all the threads of sabotage. We do not let go of the initiative of the case and we will not let go ...


Beria left for Baku, but not to break the bones of those under investigation, but to work vigorously. And everything turned out to be more complicated and confusing than he thought. Not a month passed, and not three, but eight months, however, even on May 13, 1930, in a letter to Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Beria reported: "The investigation of sabotage in Azneft is advancing at an accelerated pace." Saboteurs from "Azneft" got their way, and during the third five-year plan, oil production in the Baku region tripled.

ENSURING the security of Caucasian oil was a purely Chekist task of Chekist No. 1 of Transcaucasia. But after Beria, as the 1st secretary, headed the Transcaucasian party organization in 1932, the main task for him was the development of the oil and oil refining industry. Already in August 1932, Beria began to "embroider" one of the long-standing "bottlenecks" in the Transcaucasus - the problem of increasing oil production. He studies the state of affairs and appeals to the Center with a request to improve the technical supply of oil fields, to supply additional pipes and transport. Beria never separated the purely industrial sphere from the

social sphere - this has always been his style. Therefore, he asks Moscow not only for pipes, but also for additional food supplies, including 67 tons of cheese and 370 tons of confectionery, as well as 65 tons of linen soap, 545 thousand meters of cotton fabrics and "various manufactured goods" for 2 million rubles. In addition, he proposes to equate oil workers in supply with Moscow and Leningrad. On August 26, 1932, Kaganovich and Molotov sent a cipher to Stalin with a proposal to satisfy these requests,

but to put forward a counter request: not only to fulfill the program of oil production of 500 thousand tons given "from above" before the closure of navigation, but also to overfulfill it. The draft telegram ended like this: ***"Grozny will let you down this year, we need to put pressure on Azneft with all our might."***

Stalin imposed a resolution on the cipher: ***"Although you are overfeeding Azneft according to the "requirements" of all sorts of grabbers, I think that the telegram can still be accepted. I.St.*** Stalin enrolled Beria among the "grabbers", but he grumbled for the sake of formality, but in fact he already saw - this "grabber" can be given. First, he tries not for himself, but for the cause and for the people doing this business. And, secondly, this "grabber" is not a talker. And if you give him what you need, as a result you will get what you demand from him!



Oil fields. 1885



Oil fields 1903



Oil fields. 1912



Oil rigs. Baku. 1929

Here is another "oil" story ... In October 1933, Beria personally handed over to Stalin several memos with proposals for the development of the oil industry in Azerbaijan, and on October 21, 1933, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich:


“The situation with Baku oil is bad. This year we mine 15 mil. tons of oil. In the future, it is necessary to extract 21-22 mil. tons. To do this, it is necessary to inflate exploration, strengthen the current drilling in already explored areas, strengthen the “caspar” (Caspian Shipping Company, - **S.K.**), urgently build tanks in Makhach-Kala and Krasnovodsk, etc. If all this is not done by the deadline (i.e., during the winter with the start of work immediately), the business will be ruined. Despite this, the Oil Directorate is asleep, and Sergo gets off with pious promises ... It will be a shame for us if we fail to force the NKTyazh (People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry - S.K.) to **get** down to business immediately ... I am sending you

corresponding notes of Beria. I consider them correct, with the exception of the note about the Makhach-Kala-Stalingrad kerosene pipeline. Get to know them and act decisively."

Beria proposed to include in the 1934 plan: ÿ
the construction of crackers and plants for primary oil refining; ÿ

construction of a kerosene pipeline Makhachkala - Stalingrad; ÿ
expansion of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline; ÿ
carrying out exploration work on new areas in Azerbaijan; ÿ
construction of
new vessels for the Caspian Shipping Company.

Here everything was considered as it should be - in a complex. And this was also the style of Beria. In fact, for the first time at the head of Transcaucasia was not a pure politician, but a technocrat, moreover, a technocrat of a new, socialist type, a technocrat-politician. That is, a statesman who is able to understand special problems, but works to develop a meaningful and prosperous life for the masses. A figure who does not divide life into "production" and "social and cultural life", but sees their unity. So, the assertion of Volume 1 of TSB-2, which escaped Khrushchev's razor, that "the implementation of the Stalinist plan for the reconstruction of Azerbaijan. the oil industry was carried out with Bolshevik perseverance by students and associates ... Stalin - S.M. Kirov. G.K. Ordzhonikidze, Beria" fully corresponded to the actual state of affairs.
L.P.



Construction of the Baku-Batumi oil pipeline (1928–1930) to transport oil from the oil production area in the vicinity of Baku to the Black Sea coast to the port of Batumi



Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich (1893-1991) - state, economic and party leader

Now, in Transcaucasia, Stalin finally had a reliable person who himself was not sympathetic, and did not give to others, who, behind the “trees” of oil rigs, was able to see the whole “forest” of problems - in real time and in the future. And - which is also very valuable - he did not wait for guidance, but was proactive and independent.

More than half a century has passed since the events described. On July 25, 1991, at the age of 97, one of the creators of that era, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, died at his desk. He died while continuing his Memoirs, begun in the 1960s. In the second half of 1937, Kaganovich was appointed People's Commissar of Heavy Industry - one of the then key state

posts. Among the concerns of the new people's commissar was oil, and the concept of "Soviet oil" was then almost synonymous with the concept of "Baku oil". In 1938, the All-Union Conference of Oil Workers met in Baku - it was convened by Kaganovich after staying in Baku for two weeks. Beria was also there ... Having firmly "driven" into the oil problems even when he was the 1st secretary of the Zakkraykom, Beria strongly helped Kaganovich. And so, recalling the work of those years, Kaganovich wrote:

"I must also emphasize the great assistance provided by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the Transcaucasian regional committee of the party (in particular, Bagirov and Beria), who then actively joined in the rise of the Baku oil industry ..."

In fact, Beria and Baghirov were actively involved in the rise of the Baku oil industry not then, but almost ten years earlier, but even such restrained praise from Kaganovich ***after everything*** that happened is worth a lot. WHEREAS, in all these

"oil" cases there was one more moment, which is usually forgotten, but in vain. At the post of Chekist No. 1 of

Transcaucasia, Beria managed to "clean up" Transcaucasia so that during the Great Patriotic War there were neither serious sabotage nor serious sabotage. Then, as Communist No. 1 of Transcaucasia, Beria put things in such a way that there were no major problems in Baku with oil production and the production of petroleum products. And without a stable supply of Baku oil to the country, there would be no counter-offensive near Moscow, no Stalingrad, no victory on the Kursk Bulge ...

And there would be no Banner of Victory over Berlin.

For this alone - for the battle for military oil ***long before the war***, Beria deserved from Russia, if not a gold, then a bronze monument - for sure!

Third victory 1932–1938. Creator of New Georgia: Integration with the Big Country

SOON after the beginning of the fourth decade of the twentieth century, the level of tasks and duties of Beria not only increased fundamentally, but the tasks and duties themselves became immensely diverse. Beria faced new works and new victories on the front of the struggle for socialism and the power of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1931, Stalin went

on vacation. In fact, this meant a sparing mode of operation in the comfortable climatic conditions of the South - nothing more. But now Stalin was geographically closer to the Georgian problems. He, among other things, took up close attention to them. And immediately discovered a real political barn, the Augean stables. This proves Stalin's letter to Kaganovich dated August 26, 1931:

“Hello, Comrade Kaganovich I
am writing about Transcaucasian affairs. The other day I was
visited by members of the Regional Committee, secretaries of the
Central Committee of Georgia, some workers of Azerbaijan (including
Polonsky). Their squabble is incredible, and apparently it will not end soon...
I reconciled them somehow, and the matter has been settled for the
time being, but not for long. Almost everyone lies and cunning, starting with
Kartvelishvili. Beria, Polonsky, Orakhelashvili do not lie. But on the other
hand, Polonsky admits a number of tactlessness and mistakes. The most
unpleasant impression is made by Mamulia (Secretary of the Central
Committee of Georgia)...”,
etc.

Offering to schedule a report to the Orgburo on the state of affairs by the end of
September, by the time of his arrival, and “to remove a number of people like Mamuliya,”
Stalin ended the letter with the words: “Without such measures, things in the Transcaucasus will be
rot”.

In September 1931, the main change in Transcaucasia was expressed in the replacement of Mamulia as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia) by Lavrentiy Kartvelishvili, who still remained the 1st Secretary of the Zakkraykom. But in October Stalin returned to Moscow. On October 19, a meeting of the Orgburo was held with a hearing of the "Caucasians", and on October 31, the Politburo adopted a number of personnel decisions on the Transcaucasus. The first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the ZSFSR M.P. Orakhelashvili, third secretary - V.I. Polonsky, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party (b) of Azerbaijan. Orakhelashvili became the 1st secretary of the Zakkraykom for the second time - he had already been one in 1926-29. The Chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU, L.P. Beria.

LET'S NOT speculate - why did Stalin, who had not considered Beria's candidacy in the leadership of the Zakkraykom even as an option two less than a month before, suddenly settled on Beria in October? Yes, and with such a sharp increase! It must be assumed that Stalin had reasons for such a choice, and good ones. He thought a lot about the situation in the Caucasus, after sending a letter dated August 26, he stayed there for more than a month. That is, Stalin had time to clarify and correct his opinion.

So he corrected it. The next year, Stalin went on vacation unexpectedly early - June 1, and was absent from Moscow for almost three months - until August 27, 1932. It is possible that the reason for the early departure to the south was some kind of illness that took Stalin in the spring, and perhaps there was an attempt at poisoning. One way or another, already in June, Stalin left for the Caucasus, and from the very first day of his "vacation" he worked hard - this is proved by his almost daily correspondence with Moscow. He ended his first letter to Kaganovich with the words: ***"Well, that's all for now. I am well. Hello! I. Stalin."***

Three weeks passed, and on June 20, 1932, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich, Postyshev and Ordzhonikidze:

"Well, dear friends, squabble again. I am talking about Beria and Orakhelashvili, attaching two letters to Orakhelashvili:

one in my name, the other in the name of Ordzhonikidze. My opinion: for all the angularity in Beria's actions, Orakhelashvili is still wrong in this matter. Orakhelashvili's request must be refused, ... he can appeal to the Zakkraykom, and finally to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And there is no need for him to leave. I'm afraid that Orakhelashvili has self-esteem in the foreground (they pecked at "his" people), and not the interests of the cause and positive work ... "

So far, Stalin is not inclined to replace Orakhelashvili and in a letter dated June 20 he said: "Everyone says that positive work is going well in Georgia, the mood of the peasants has become good. And this is the main thing at work. Hello. I. Stalin. Who was right in the conflict

that arose - the old (since 1903) Bolshevik Orakhelashvili, a fifty-year-old party intellectual who graduated from the Military Medical Academy in 1908, in 1921 - the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, or "this" Beria with his party experience "only" with 1917? The essence of the "conflict" was that Orakhelashvili's wife, 45-year-old beauty Maria

Orakhelashvili, also an old Bolshevik, after her husband's "renaissance" was appointed People's Commissar of Education of Georgia, and on June 10, 1932, she was relieved of her post at the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia for "spreading false rumors and an attempt to oppose the Central Committee of Georgia to the Zakkraykom and discredit individual leaders of the Central Committee and the Tiflis Committee (in particular Comrade Beria)". It seems that Beria's new hypostasis - the party leader, was liked by many in Georgia even less than his hypostasis of the Chekist. In Georgia, they are used to working neither shaky nor quickly, but here - on you, at the head of Georgia - a bundle of energy.

Beria was tired of the fuss around him for a long time, and he appealed to the Central Committee - in the party order. And the Orakhelashvilis ran to their old leading party comrades. Kaganovich, having familiarized himself in Moscow with the essence of the claims and complaints of the Orakhelashvili couple, communicated his opinion to Stalin in a letter dated June 23, 1932. He wrote: "... 11) A new squabble really ignites in Transcaucasia. You are certainly right that a healthy start, especially in business terms, is on Beria's side. Orakhelashvili reflects the aching, non-business circles of the asset."

"WHINING" leading circles were against Beria. Working circles were already entirely for Beria. Normal people don't want to quarrel, don't be smart, don't tear their noses, don't beat their thumbs... They want to work! Normal work in Georgia did not go well for many years, and then an intelligent person stood at the head of the business, and it turned out that the affairs of the solar republic were not so bad!

But the conflict did not subside, and it was a conflict between the growing competence of Beria and the decreasing competence of Orakhelashvili, between the young and old party members of Georgia.

In 1910, in a letter from the Caucasus to Tiflis, Stalin noted the "special propensity" of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussions. He explained this by the fact that in Tiflis they had to wage an especially stubborn ideological struggle against the Mensheviks. However, it is not for nothing that they say that if you sow a habit, you reap a character, and if you sow a character, you reap a destiny. The habit of verbal battles before the revolution determined the tendency of the Georgian party, state and economic leadership of the 1920s and early 1930s to chatter instead of concrete deeds. That is, just to what Beria did not know how and did not tolerate. On July 13, 1932, Beria informed Kaganovich: ***"I was twice with Comrade Koba and had the opportunity to inform him in detail about our affairs."*** And on August 12, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich:

“... Beria makes a good impression. A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker. Looking closely at the Transcaucasian affairs, I am more and more convinced that in the matter of selecting people, Sergo (Ordzhonikidze, - **S.K.**) is an incorrigible bungler. Sergo defended Mamulia's candidacy for the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, but now it is obvious (even for the blind) that Mamulia is not worth Beria's left foot.

The very logic of the situation pushed Stalin to the need to release Orakhelashvili from the post of first secretary of the Zakkraykom. But who will replace him? Reflecting, Stalin continued:

“Although Beria is not a member (and not even a candidate) of the Central Committee, he will still have to be nominated for the post of first secretary of the Zakkraykom, Polonsky (his candidacy) is not suitable, since he does not speak any of the local languages” ...

In mid-August 1932, Beria arrived in Moscow. He put several questions before the Politburo, and they were to be discussed at the next meeting on August 16. The meeting took place, and on the same day Kaganovich notified Stalin:

“Beria was with me. Indeed, he makes a very good impression of a major worker. We discussed a number of his questions today at the PB. ... We will give them buses at the expense of Moscow ... ”.



House in Tbilisi, where Lavrenty Beria lived with his family from 1931 to 1938



Tbilisi. View of the city and the Kura River. 1931 Photo by William Osgood Field

So, Beria came to Moscow not to quarrel - as Maria Orakhelashvili came there, but to intercede for the republic. He substantiated all requests - otherwise no one would have satisfied them. Beria managed, as we see, even from Moscow to “chop off” something, and received 10 buses, 10 Ford cars and 8 trucks that were previously allocated capital.

Formally, Orakhelashvili was still at the head of Transcaucasia, but in fact people went to Beria, and, in addition to the problems of Georgia, the problems of the entire Transcaucasus were already falling on him. And he solved them. And more and more often these were problems integrated into the problems and plans of a large, huge country - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, so far - as a political leader only of the Georgian SSR, Beria could fully express himself only on the Georgian "bridgehead".

LAVRENTY Pavlovich Beria, without exaggeration, can be called the creator of the new Georgia. Under Beria, Georgia quickly changed - from the former backyard of the empire, it became strategically important

industrial and agricultural region, entered the all-Union economy and all-Union life as a bright and necessary element. And the brilliant work on the socialist reconstruction of Transcaucasia and Georgia, on the creation of a new Georgia as the most important part of the USSR, became the third major victory of Lavrenty Beria. Today it is forgotten, or rather, hushed up, but Georgia in the early 1930s was not at all the same Georgia that it had become by the end of the 1930s. In 1934, the writer Konstantin Paustovsky wrote the story "Colchis", where one of its characters, the old man Pakhomov, says: "In Colchis, the climate of Southern Japan and Sumatra, an abundance

of heat, but meanwhile it is a malarial desert in the full sense of the word. Something like a tropical hard labor. If not for the swamps, then we would have blocked Java and Ceylon with their splendor and riches "... The plot of Paustovsky's book is built around the struggle to drain the swamps in the Rioni River basin, flowing to the sea along the Colchis lowland. At the end, engineer Kahiani makes a speech. In response to his question: "Who had malaria?", Only the boy with the red tie did not raise his hand. And Kakhiani

had every reason to say: "... not only the value of our work lies in the fact that we drain the swamps and create new land, that we radically destroy the old marsh vegetation ... and plant a new one. This is not the only point of our work, comrades. It is also in the fact that we create a young, healthy

generation".



One of the central streets of Tbilisi. 1931
Photo by William Osgood Field



Borjomi. The building of the sanatorium.
1931 Photo by William Osgood Field

It was in this - in the destruction of the rotten old and the planting of a healthy new in all spheres of life in Transcaucasia, that the essence of the activity of Lavrenty Beria and the "team" he selected was. A new attitude to life was being formed - not passive, submissive, but active, innovative, transforming ... Why did the bourgeois liberal-Westerner Noah Zhordania

need Georgian lemons, tangerines, Georgian tea? He could order lemons from Italy, tangerines from Morocco, and tea from India. Even in their wildest dreams, Jordania and other Georgian Mensheviks could not imagine Tiflis as a major mathematical center. And did they have dreams - not empty, but realistic, expressing a social perspective?! There was nothing like this in the minds of various kinds of jordans and tseretelis. Steeped in ambitions and squabbles, the "old party members" were also not capable of business, so to speak, romance. And Beria was capable himself, and could evaluate and direct the dreams and impulses of others into a business channel. In 1934, a special issue of the Ogonyok magazine was published under the title "Soviet Subtropics". It talked a lot about the creation of "Soviet Florida", there were calls to catch up and overtake California. There was also a large photo

of Lavrenty Beria - in Yefim's essay

Zozuli "Subtropical people". And here is what Zozulya wrote about Beria:

"He has solid, military skills at work. Huge experience. In his face, attention is drawn to the expression of will, combined with a special acute thoughtfulness. He tells us about the subtropics. He says with great enthusiasm: "Yes, this region will be one of the best in the country!"..."

In these words - the whole of Beria. And, speaking of the Georgian subtropics as a region that will be the best in the country, by "country" Beria meant the entire USSR! He worked, creating not "Georgian Florida", but "**Soviet** Florida". In the same spirit, he educated others, overcoming localism, national prejudices and

prejudice. Day after day, with one or the other accomplishment, he integrated Georgia into the flow of all-Union work.

Beria became, perhaps, the most important reformer of Georgia in the entire history of Georgia. And, in any case, he became its most successful reformer. Successful, because Beria, as a Bolshevik and Stalin's ally, made personnel, new people working for society, the basis of all successes, because doing this is damn interesting!



Special issue of the Ogonyok magazine. 1934



Pages from the special issue "Soviet subtropics". 1934
year



Portrait of Lavrenty Beria in the special issue "Soviet Subtropics".
1934



Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party Lavrenty Beria, 1930s years

When Beria was promoted to the leadership of Transcaucasia, the true anthem of socialism, the "March of Enthusiasts" by D'Aktil and Dunayevsky, had not yet been written, but those who would soon be singing were already growing up:

***In the everyday life of great
construction projects, In a cheerful roar, in
fires and ringing, Hello, the country
of heroes, The country of dreamers, the country of scientists!..***

Beria was a realist dreamer. In his mature years, he was often an ironic realist. However, Lavrenty Pavlovich always knew the price of romance and high feeling as factors in ensuring the success ***of the business*** . He convinced the Georgian peasant with hardened hands with a practical calculation of the profitability, high profitability of citrus or tea growing, instead of growing corn. But he aimed the son of this peasant no longer at profit, but at ***a dream*** - as the main stimulus and nerve of life. And brought under this dream

a real base - primarily in the form of an increasingly powerful higher education in Georgia. Orakhelashvili still remained the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), that is, the political body of the leadership of the entire Transcaucasus. But in Georgia, everything healthy and active was already limited to the second secretary of the Zakkraykom and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, Comrade Beria.

HOWEVER, he took on the Transcaucasian problems in general, especially since many of these problems were also all-Union. The same Baku oil was mentioned earlier, and there are enough examples of Beria's activities on the scale of the entire Transcaucasus. But then we will dwell in detail, nevertheless, on Georgia - here the multifaceted talent and essence of Beria manifested itself most clearly. Here, let's say, such a curious moment ... Quoting Kaganovich's letter to Stalin dated August 16, 1932 - the place where Kaganovich writes about Beria's visit, about the allocation of buses to Georgia at the expense of Moscow, I deliberately released the phrase: "In particular, they removed another 300 buses from Georgia t. pud. bread ... "The fact is that Beria, while being the second - after Orakhelashvili, a man in Transcaucasia, but already the first in Georgia, with his power" lowered "to the regions of Georgia a plan for grain procurements reduced by 430 thousand pounds (about 7 thousand tons) .

The plan as a whole for the ZSFSR was also reduced by a decree of the Zakkraykom from 4 million poods to 2.5 million poods. On July 23, 1932, the Politburo canceled the decision of the Zakkraykom on the entire Transcaucasus, but did not cancel the reduction of the plan for Georgia, although it assessed Beria's actions as "arbitrary". Moreover, after Beria visited Kaganovich in mid-August and reported on the reasons for the reduction in the grain procurement plan, asked for a seed loan, the Politburo found it possible to reduce Georgia's plan even more.



L.P. Beria (left) in 1934 (behind the assistant to the secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) and the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia V. N. Merkulov)



From left to right: Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Georgian SSR Filipp Makharadze, First Secretary of the Baku City Committee of the Communist Party (b) and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR Mir Jafar Bagirov and Lavrenty Beria, 1935

Judging by this decision, even then Beria was going to drastically re-profile Georgian agriculture for subtropical crops, and in this case, was it worth losing the support of the Georgian peasantry and demanding from him increased supplies of grain - in terms of their volume on the scale of the USSR, pennies. Moscow agreed with him. And Beria saw many other changes in the near future, which he

was ready and able to initiate and carry out. Looking ahead, I must say that he succeeded. Well, maybe not everything - it doesn't happen in life, but a lot - yes, it was done, and - in just less than six years! **Only six years were allotted to Beria for his titanic - together with the people - reformist work in Georgia. God the Father created the world in six days, but the creator-Bolshevik Beria also created a new Caucasus in six "years of creation" - from 1932 to 1938.** In 1932, Beria reached the age of Christ, and managed a lot in his thirty-three years. But even more he had to do - together with the country.

On October 9, 1932, the Politburo granted the request of Mamia Orakhelashvili to release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Zakkraykom and appointed Beria as the first secretary, leaving him as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Soon Beria became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b). He headed Transcaucasia on the eve of the second five-year plan, and this was a mutual success - both for Beria and for Transcaucasia. Beria got the opportunity for wider activities, and the Transcaucasus received an active leader capable of solving the upcoming grandiose tasks. Let's compare the Soviet Union with an airplane... Wings are industry and

agriculture. The motor is a science, and the rudders are the mood of the masses, their readiness to respond to control actions from the cockpit. If it fails, if one of the main structural elements of the aircraft does not work, normal flight is impossible. But in Stalin's USSR, the "plane" flew more and more confidently forward and upward with increasing speed.

The same thing happened with the "aircraft" of Transcaucasia, when Lavrenty Beria sat at its "helm". Suffice it to say that by 1936 the share of industry in the total national economy of the Transcaucasian SFSR reached 72%! This is how Beria worked on the scale of the ZSFSR. Moreover, let's not forget - a stable economic and social situation in the Transcaucasus in the future was created by the efforts of Beria as chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU. The secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Georgian Central Committee knew all the "sick" problems of Transcaucasia and Georgia professionally - as a Chekist. This is also why he acted so successfully and unerringly when he became the party

leader of the most important region for four years. Looking ahead, let me remind you that under the Stalinist Constitution of 1936, the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, formed as part of the USSR in 1922, was abolished. The Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSRs were part of the USSR directly as independent republics. On December 5, 1936, the Georgian SSR was transformed into a union republic, and in February 1937, the 8th Congress of Soviets of Georgia adopted a new constitution for the Georgian SSR. From that moment on, Beria focuses on purely Georgian problems, while retaining the general Caucasian influence as an effective and competent manager, who knows the entire region perfectly. As for the Georgian "steering wheel", Beria always held it confidently, and the comparison of Georgia with an airplane is not so far-fetched - through the efforts of Beria, an aviation industry was created in Georgia in the second half of the 1930s, and the Tbilisi Aviation Plant still before the war he mastered the production of fighters. How it was useful to the whole country during the war! Under Beria, the production of

electricity, the "bread" of industry, immediately began to grow in Georgia. Beria built the republican industry itself as part of the all-Union industry, integrated into the economy of the entire USSR. This was genuine proletarian internationalism - not chatter from the stands, but the businesslike merging of all the republics of the Soviet Union into a single economic organism.

On February 4, 1932, the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) finished its work. The congress approved all-Union directives for a new five-year plan for 1932-37. Beria at the XVII Congress was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). And in March 1932, the joint plenum of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the main directions of the five-year plan for the development of the Transcaucasian Federation. The volume of industrial production in Georgia was to increase by more than five times, the production of ferroalloys by seven and a half times, and coal mining by twelve times.

These were already signs of

a new, only emerging Georgia, Beria. And that was just the beginning... In October 1933, Beria handed over to Stalin, in addition to notes on oil, another note on rare metals. And Stalin wrote to Kaganovich: ***"I am sending you information from Beria about rare metals in Georgia. This matter must also be moved forward."*** Beria's "rare earth" note was as specific as the "oil" notes. It talked about Chiatura manganese, about polymetallic molybdenum and lead-zinc deposits, about the production of aluminum oxide.

Beria was neither a geologist, nor an oilman, nor a metallurgist. He did not put forward the idea of new exploration, he did not assess the need for a new oil pipeline or the prospects of polymetallic deposits. But if earlier the ideas of specialists were deadened by the incompetence of the "old Bolsheviks" like Lavrenty Kartvelishvili, now the professionals came to life with the competent support of Lavrenty Beria. And not only support should be discussed here! Beria was in

able to put forward strong ideas himself. And
put forward.

And not only put forward, supported, but also put into action, into a material result. The reserves of manganese ores in Georgia were of world importance. Manganese was mined at the Chiatura mines under the tsar... And under Kartvelishvili... And under Orakhelashvili... But the scale, volume of production, its methods - everything changed under Beria both quantitatively and qualitatively. And how much this manganese was needed in Zaporozhye, in Magnitogorsk, in Mariupol ... Previously, things

were stalled with the same polymetals. And now it has moved from a dead point. This was also the contribution of Beria's Georgia

into the growing power of the entire Soviet

Union. Mechanical engineering was developing - of union significance, silk production was developing with silk-winding and silk-weaving factories, headed by the Kutaisi silk factory named after Bakradze. In 1932, 200 thousand pairs of shoes were produced in Georgia, and in 1939, one Tbilisi shoe factory named after L.P. Beria produced 6 million pairs of shoes a year. Not only were good-quality shoes and boots sewn for Georgians - Georgian shoes were worn in various cities and villages throughout a large country. The drainage of the malarial swamps of Colchis has

already been mentioned. At that time, 10 million (!) eucalyptus trees were planted in Georgia - natural "killers" of swampy swamps. As Beria's biography reported in 1939:

“Under the direct guidance of Comrade L. Beria, grandiose work was carried out aimed at turning 220,000 hectares of centuries-old impenetrable swamps, a hotbed of malicious destructive malaria, into a flowering garden ...

Comrade L. Beria personally dealt with all issues related to the drainage of Colchis, with the organization of the resettlement business, in particular, he himself chose and indicated places for the construction of new settlements, considered projects for residential buildings, taking care of the maximum convenience for the collective farmers-migrants ... ”

This is not a ceremonial report in any line. This is pure truth, as well as the fact that such cases were for Beria the same delicacy as for a gourmet - soup seasoned with grated truffles. After all, Beria not only had the education of an architect, builder, not only passionately desired to be a builder, but also became one - the builder of new Georgia!

The agricultural face of Georgia has changed even MORE startlingly. Beria reoriented agricultural production in Georgia to the cultivation of crops that the mountainous and subtropical zone of Georgia could almost exclusively give to the Soviet Union: citrus fruits, tea, tobacco, valuable industrial crops ... Already in 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in their resolution

noted that the achievements of Georgia marked the beginning of the independence of the Soviet Union in the production of tea. If in 1913 tea plantations in Georgia occupied less than 1 thousand hectares, in 1932 - about 19 thousand hectares, then by 1940 - more than 47 thousand hectares. Moreover, the yield of tea leaves increased from 750 kilograms per hectare in 1932 to 3000...4000 kilograms in 1939! Georgia's

agriculture acquired obvious all-Union significance. Before the war, up to 400 million tangerines and lemons were harvested from citrus trees a year. A cannery was built in Batumi, designed to produce 8 million canned citrus fruits a year. However, Beria did not start with tea and lemons, but with the fact that in December 1931 he liquidated the Georgian Collective Farm Center, replacing it with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. And unlike, for example, Kosior and Khatayevich in Ukraine, who were later shot, he did not reduce, but even somewhat expanded, the subsidiary plots of collective farmers in order to avoid the threat of starvation. At the same time, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia

did a lot of organizational work both in his office and when he traveled to the villages. Plenums of the Georgian Central Committee were devoted to individual crops, congresses of collective farmers were held, exhibitions were organized, portraits of leading workers adorned the front pages of newspapers and magazine covers. As a result, in January 1934, at the IX Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, Beria had every right to say:

“A completely stable situation in the countryside of Georgia, the strengthening of collective farms, the growth of collectivization, the successful introduction of special and industrial crops, ... and the conscientious fulfillment by collective farmers and working individual farmers of their obligations to the state have become a reality.”

And here is the digital “background” of what has been said: in 1931, 36% of peasant farms were united in collective farms, by 1939 - 86%. At the same time, in 1936 the income of collective farms amounted to 234,992 thousand rubles, and in 1939 they exceeded half a billion.



Georgian tea packaging



Tea picking in Georgia

It was with the advent of Beria to the leadership of Georgia that plantations of tung were laid, giving fatty oil used in the paint and varnish, shipbuilding, aviation, automotive, chemical industries and in the electrical industry. By 1939, tung in Soviet Georgia was grown on 16,000 hectares. Plantations of essential oil crops, noble laurel, ramie, medlar, feijoa, figs, pomegranates, persimmons grew rapidly ... This is in addition to the development of traditional fruit growing and viticulture!

Such were the results of the work in Georgia - for Georgia and for the entire USSR - Beria the "agrarian". Later, bearing in mind this incarnation of him, they wrote that as an organizer of agricultural production, Beria "turned out to be at a height that was accessible to very, very few."

It would be fair to add only one union to what has been said: "... and as an organizer of agricultural production," since under Beria Georgia also became a leader in the creation of the Soviet food industry in terms of canning fruits and vegetables, industrial winemaking, tea processing. Here, Beria's closest associate from the ZakChK, Vladimir Dekanozov, who became the people's commissar of the food industry of the Georgian SSR, worked hard.

BUT BERIA was no less competent in organizing the cultural revolution in Transcaucasia. At that time, when Madame Orakhelashvili was working in the field of Georgian public education, there were several hastily opened "universities" in Georgia capable of giving students a "higher" education, rather in quotation marks. Under the leader of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria, the situation here began to change before our eyes. At the end of 1931 and 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia adopted six resolutions on issues of public education.



Tung, or Oil tree, Tung tree (lat. *Aleurites*) is a small genus of trees of the Euphorbiaceae family, common in

tropical and subtropical regions of Asia and South America, as well as the Pacific Islands. Seeds of tung species are a source of valuable technical oil, which has the ability to dry quickly in air. Due to this property, it is widely used for the production of varnishes and paints. Tung oil is also soluble in most organic solvents.



Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov (1898–1953). In

1921-1931 he worked in the Extraordinary Commission in the AzSSR and the GSSR. Then he was appointed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia: Secretary for Transport and Supply, Head of the Department of Soviet Trade, since 1936 People's Commissar of the Food Industry of Georgia, since 1937 Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the GSSR



Tbilisi State University Stalin



Academy of Arts in Tbilisi

In the previous five years of leadership of Georgia, Papulia Orakhelashvili-Kartvelishvili-Orakhelashvili issues were considered only twice, and then - in the framework of the discussion of the decisions of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Now the resolutions of the Georgian Central Committee were concrete and business-like. Since 1932, universal primary education has been introduced in Georgia. This is for children and teenagers. At the same time, according to the Komsomol recruitment, thousands of Georgian boys and girls were sent to study at the universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Saratov ... By 1938, Georgia was one of the first places in the Soviet Union in terms of the level of education of the population. And by the beginning of the 20th century, the

illiteracy rate in Georgia was 79%. Without becoming a certified engineer himself, Lavrenty Pavlovich understood perfectly well that the new Georgia needed a lot of its highly qualified specialists. And as soon as, by the will of Stalin, the personnel security officer Beria was at the head of socialist Georgia, he, already as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, began to ta

the most active efforts to develop Georgian science and culture. It was under Beria that their heyday began.

In 1913, there was one university in Georgia, by 1941 there were twenty-one. Only in Tbilisi appeared an industrial institute, the Institute of Railway Engineers named after V.I. Lenin, Agricultural Institute named after L.P. Beria, veterinary, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, theater institutes and the Academy of Arts. Pedagogical institutes were opened in Gori, Kutaisi, Staliniri and Sukhumi. The list was headed by Tbilisi State University named after I.V. Stalin.

In 1938, an institute of physical culture was opened in Tbilisi - on the initiative of Beria, who always paid special attention to this side of life and was personally not alien to sports hobbies. It is indicative that of the six institutes of physical culture that existed in the USSR before the war, two were opened in Transcaucasia (except for Tbilisi, in Baku). Actually, the high level of Georgian football already in the thirties is due to Beria. And besides, Tbilisi owes him a wonderful republican stadium, not accidentally named the same way as the Chekist sports society: the Dynamo stadium, and it was not by chance that it bore the name of Beria until the summer of 1953. In the development of republican sports, Beria's style was also manifested - he was the most athletic of the Soviet leaders, he played football, volleyball, and shot perfectly. In 1913 there were three theaters in

Georgia, by 1941 there were forty-eight. The number of students in schools more than quadrupled during the twenty Soviet years and in 1937 amounted to 665.3 thousand people, with a population of then Georgia of 3.5 million people. Of course, similar processes were going on throughout the USSR, but Beria's Georgia was ahead of almost everyone here. The same must be said about healthcare.



Ilya Nestorovich Vekua (1907–1977) was a Soviet mathematician and mechanic who specialized in partial differential equations, singular integral equations, generalized analytic functions, and the mathematical theory of elastic shells.



Badge of a graduate of the Institute of Physical Culture



Monument to Shota Rustaveli in Tbilisi. Sculptor K. Merabishvili

In terms of the number of students per 1,000 people, Beria's Georgia surpassed England and Germany! And the quality of higher education in Georgia was already very good - the results of sending young talented Georgians (and, let's not forget, Georgians!) to study at the best universities of the USSR had an effect. In the second half of the 1930s, they began to return to their homeland and formed an energetic backbone of scientific and creative national personnel.

Under Beria, the foundations for the future glory of Georgian mathematics, Georgian applied science and engineering were laid. An illustrative example is the young mathematician Nestor Vekua. For the "democrats", 1937 personifies the Gulag, and in 1937, after graduating from Moscow State University, Vekua began to read a course of lectures at Tbilisi University. In fact, in the pre-war USSR, of all non-Slavic peoples, first of all, the Georgians quickly began to play a prominent role in the all-Union scientific, technical and cultural life. And this was not least due to the policy of Beria personally in the field of education, science and culture. **Beria in a matter of years, from 1932 to 1938, managed to develop the creative potential of Georgians to the maximum and make it significant on an all-Union**

scale. In 1937, it was 100 years since the death of Pushkin, and Tbilisi was actively preparing for the Pushkin anniversary. They were preparing to celebrate the 750th anniversary of Rustaveli's poem "The Knight in the Panther's Skin". The glory of Georgian literature, the treasurer of Queen Tamara, the sovereign feudal lord, Shota Rustaveli in the 12th century sang honor, justice, goodness, denied evil as a natural principle. The anniversary of Rustaveli's poem became in 1938 the same all-Union holiday as the anniversary of Pushkin, and the fact that the entire country loudly celebrated the anniversary of the

creation of the Georgian was the merit not only of Stalin, but also of Beria. The hand of Beria was also felt in the fact that in Georgia in 1934 the Republican Union of Architects was created - one of the first in the USSR. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, subordinate to Beria on the party line, such unions were also created quickly, with the assistance of the same Beria, an archi

BERIA, an outstanding reformer of Georgia and an outstanding builder, did more for its comprehensive development than any other Georgian in the entire history of the Georgian people. And all-round development ensured the development of the national pride of the Georgians, their independence, the development of the Georgian socialist statehood within the framework of a single Union. **Stalin turned out to be the first - according to the results of his creation - a figure in all-Russian history, having no equal in world history. But even he, the first Georgian among the great Georgians of all time, did not give as much strength to the new Georgia as Beria gave them.**

Before the revolution, the name of Prince Bagration was known and honored in Russia, and he was indeed a "significant" figure. A descendant of the kings of Georgia, Bagration, while remaining a Georgian, became the flesh of the flesh of the all-Russian fate, all-Russian history. Bagration and the true patriots of Georgia did not separate or alienate Georgia from Russia, but brought them closer in the interests of Russians and Georgians. In this sense, Beria became the heir and continuer of the best traditions of Georgian patriots. In the

history of Georgia - and this can be said about the history of far from all small peoples - there are a number of outstanding rulers. "King of Kings" David III, David the Builder (Renewer) from the Bagration dynasty, his great-granddaughter Tamara, the great Mouravi George Saakadze, King Vakhtang VI, who founded in exile - after the occupation of Tiflis by the Turks - a Georgian colony in Moscow ... Their names were not known in the Soviet Union only historians, but also schoolchildren - in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Khabarovsk, in Siberian and Ural rural schools ... Lavrenty Beria also deserves to be among the largest builders of the Georgian state, which has always naturally gravitated towards Russia. Moreover, Beria turned out to be a great builder of new Georgia, not only figuratively, but also in the literal sense of the word. Beria's Georgia massively built new factories, new quarters of cities and new cities, stadiums, sanatoriums, rest houses, hospitals ...

It is symbolic that on the same day, October 31, 1931, when Beria was recommended by the Politburo as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted on the creation of a network of resorts in Georgia. Tskhaltubo, Abastumani, Borjomi, Bakuriani, Gagra, Sukhumi, Gulripshi - these places soon became known far beyond the borders of Georgia. They were unrecognizably transformed, and how new sanatoriums and rest homes were useful to the country during the war - no longer for recreation, but for the treatment and return to service of the wounded. Beria was directly involved in the creation of the resort area, as well as in general with all major construction projects. Particularly outstanding was the personal contribution of Beria to the socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi.

NEW Tbilisi! This one thing could absorb all his time, if you remember that the problems of construction and architecture were for Beria as a first love. Beria knew the construction business

professionally and was prepared not only theoretically - his official dacha in Gagra was built according to his own project, which contained all the drawings and calculations. And he gave not only his heart, but also his mind and knowledge to the cause of the reconstruction of Tbilisi.



View of the resort. Gagra. 1940



Sanatorium "Amra" Gagra



Sanatorium them. Stalin. Gagra



Sanatorium in New Athos (Abkhazia). 1946

In the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, there was no place for a separate article about Beria - when volumes with the letter "B" were published, Beria worked in the GPU, and this department did not seek to advertise its leaders. But volume 53rd TSB-1, published in 1946, in the article "Tbilisi" reported:

"A new era in the history of T[bilisi] begins after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia (1921). T[bilisi] becomes the capital of the Georgian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation. The rapid development of the city ... takes on the character of its complete reconstruction, carried out under the leadership of L.P. Beria "... So it was! In 1926,

294,044 inhabitants lived in Tiflis,
and in 1939 in Tbilisi - already 519,175, almost twice as many!

The general plan for the development of the capital of Georgia was considered in June 1933 at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Tiflis city committee, where the main report was made by the first secretary of the Central Committee and the city committee L.P. Beria. The report was the result of collective work, but Beria was the leading and guiding force here, not only by position, but also by

in fact, although the official authors of the master plan were the architects Z. Kurdiani, I. Malozyomov, G. Gogava and the economist G. Sheilekhovsky. Malozemov previously participated in the work on the general plan of Zaporozhye, was later one of the authors of the plan for the restoration of Kiev, but he, like other developers of the general plan of Tbilisi, cannot be attributed to especially large architectural quantities. But this master plan bore a clear imprint of Beria's style.

In the textbook for universities "History of Soviet Architecture (1917-1954)", published in 1985, about the problems of restructuring Tbilisi says:

"The need for the construction of new government, administrative, scientific and cultural institutions, industrial buildings and structures could not fit into the framework of the former Tbilisi. Overcrowded residential areas of the old city were molded along the Kura River and cut through by a network of narrow streets winding along the relief. The improvement and engineering equipment of the city was at an extremely low level. There was not enough water, landscaping was insufficient. In summer, the city, located in a hollow, was poorly ventilated and suffered from overheating ... "And then, without, of course, any mention of Beria, said:

"The authors (of the general plan — **S.K.**) preserved the historically established planning structure of the city, but at the same time subjected it to reconstruction... The total area of landscaping was doubled." Re-create

without destroying - it must be able to! **In Beria's —**

there is every reason to call it that — plan for the reconstruction of Tbilisi, an integrated, systematic approach was implemented. Issues of architectural appearance were linked with issues of all types of communications, rational placement of residential, administrative, public and industrial zones, reasonable redevelopment without losing the existing identity of the city. Suffice it to say that during the reconstruction all the architectural sights of old Tiflis were preserved, including *almost all* the old churches.


Beria knew how to attract innovators to the cause. So, one of the developers of the general plan of Tbilisi, G. Sheilekhovsky, was a pioneer in the study of the problem of “housing and climate”. The architect E. Kalashnikov built a “hundred-apartment house” in Tbilisi, the plan of which was based on a duplex section with good ventilation of the rooms and the orientation of most rooms to the south, which removed excess solar radiation at the hottest time when the sun is high.



Square them. Beria in Tbilisi. 1938



The construction of the bridge. Chelyuskintsev. Tbilisi. 1935



Construction of the stadium "Dynamo". 1935



Rustaveli Avenue. Tbilisi 1940

During the two pre-war five-year plans, 219 million rubles (Stalin's!) were invested in the municipal services of Tbilisi. The main highways and squares of the city underwent, as TSB-1 wrote, "a radical, sometimes very complex restructuring." New residential area Vake... Beria Square... Kalyaev's rise, connecting the main working area with the center... Completely renovated station square... Three-kilometer-long embankment named after Stalin... New bridges, including the Chelyuskintsev bridge... Rustaveli Avenue and the circus on the hill in at the end of this avenue... Dynamo Stadium named after Beria... A beautiful park of culture and recreation with an area of 50 hectares on Mount David, from where panoramas of Tbilisi and the Caucasus Range opened... New parks on the former Madatovsky Island and on the Funicular Plateau...

The funicular, built in 1936-38, was the pride of both Tbilisi and Beria ... But one could be proud of the new powerful water pipeline with Natakhtari spring water, and the new thermal power plant ... And the automatic telephone exchange ... And the large bath building near sulfur springs ... And the Botanical garden ... And the buildings of the Tbilisi Institute of Railway Engineers named after V.I. Lenin ... And the town of the Institute of Bacteriology ... And yet - the rebuilt tram lines, as well as the new city transport for Tbilisi - a bus and a trolleybus.



A hundred-apartment building (under construction)
and a zoo. Tbilisi. 1937



Circus building. Tbilisi. 1938



Funicular. Tbilisi 97



Lenin Street near Heroes Square



Government House. Tbilisi



Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute

In 1938, the ensemble of the Palace of the Government of Georgia was completed according to the project of Professor V. Kokorin. It was the largest building in Transcaucasia. According to the project of Academician A. Shchusev with the participation of architect P. Sardaryan, in the same 1938, a monumental building of the Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute was built. Dirty and dusty Tiflis has gone into oblivion. And sunny Tbilisi became the pride and decoration not only of

Georgia, but of the entire Soviet Union. This is what the years 1937 and 1938 were like for the Georgian capital and for Lavrenty Beria... Not only business energy, but also Beria's architectural talent was invested in Tbilisi, which was transforming before our eyes, in its socialist general development plan. This must be remembered, and, above all, by the residents of Tbilisi themselves. However, in today's Georgia, which is rapidly becoming provincial and graying, breaking away from Russia, they prefer to simply not know Beria! Unbelievable, but true - in the Georgian Wikipedia, only a few lines are

devoted to Lavrenty Pavlovich: "Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. Born March 17/March 29, 1899, Merheuli, present-day Gulripsh municipality, which in 1946

separated from the Sukhumi municipality (in 1946 from the municipality? - **S.K.**) within the current borders. He died on December 23, 1953, in Moscow (according to other sources, June 26, 1953). State and political figure of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union (since 1945), Hero of Socialist Labor (since 1943). After Stalin's death, a struggle for power began in the highest circles of power. In 1953, Beria was arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy. This is all. Old Tiflis, being

transformed by

the people of Georgia led by Beria into a new Tbilisi, has turned from the second half of the 1930s into one huge construction site. And Beria often came or came to objects under construction at night - it was easier to get an objective idea of the real state of affairs and dream after the usual bustle of the day, in the silence of the night, about the unfulfilled ... About the title of architect that he never achieved.

1934 became the year of foundation of the Union of Architects of Georgia. This was a general trend in the USSR - the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on architecture dates back to 1932. But the fact that in Georgia, as well as in Armenia, in Azerbaijan, this case was not delayed was due to the position of Beria. His opinion, as the former first secretary of the Zakkraykom, even after the abolition of the TSFSR, was certainly significant, and the fact, for example, that in 1938 a new, seriously revised general plan for the restructuring of Yerevan was adopted in Armenia, proves Beria's attention not only to Tbilisi. Beria also paid attention to the master plan for the new Baku,

adopted in 1938 to replace the old one, developed in 1925-1927. Formally, Beria never built a single building in his life. However, he became, nevertheless, an architect, but not of some kind of ensemble - even the most grandiose, but an architect in the great restructuring of the whole society, all of Russia. Beria began with the restructuring of Georgia. At the same time, he had to not only create, but also destroy - destroy the plans of those who interfered with creation. I had to - what to do - to repress the enemies of the new system, renegades, and at the same time old bandits with a criminal record. The summer of 1937 ended in the everyday life of Georgian construction sites, and an all-union action began to p

anti-Party elements, as well as agents of foreign secret services and the "fifth column".

BEFORE the eyes of the Bolsheviks was the sad experience of the Paris Commune of 1871. The indecisiveness of its leaders in suppressing the counter-revolution led to the fall of the Communards, which was followed by massacres of the "Versailles" against the people. The danger of the restoration of capitalism due to the external and internal efforts of the enemies of the USSR existed in the 1930s, and then the counter-revolutionaries would have flooded Russia with blood thicker than the "bloody dwarf"

Thiers drenched Paris with blood. Much more can be said about the "37th year", but in a short book about Beria's victories, we will touch on the topic of repression only to the extent that this will help us better understand the hero of the book. The repressions of 1937-1938 in Georgia are presented by anti-Sovietists as an unjustified act of a "sadist in pince-nez." In reality, everything was different. An active operation to "clean up" Georgia began even before the publication of the famous operational order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00447 "On the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements." The beginning of the all-Union operation is dated August 5, 1937, but already on July 20, 1937, Beria personally sent a note to Stalin, where he wrote:

"Dear Koba! The investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionaries in Georgia is unfolding further, revealing new participants in the most heinous crimes against the Party and Soviet power. The arrest of G. Mgaloblishvili, L. Lavrentyev (Kartvelishvili), Sh. Eliava, M. Orakhelashvili, Lukashin and others, and the testimonies given by them during the investigation, shed a bright light on the treacherous sabotage and sabotage espionage and terrorist work th

The repressive operation of 1937-38 is often associated with the provocations of Eikhe, Postyshev, Khrushchev, etc., who were frightened by the idea of alternative elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which Stalin proposed. There is a reason for such an interpretation of the unfolding events. But should we forget that one of the reasons for the repression was the urgent need to neutralize internal threats in the face of growing external threats?

The situation in Georgia remained particularly difficult. And this was clearly seen from the specifics of Beria's note dated July 20, 1937. Beria reported: ***“From ... testimonies it is established that Ph.D. The organization of the rightists was created in Georgia in 1928, on the one hand, on Rykov’s directive, brought from Moscow by G. Kurulov, and on the other hand, on the instructions of Bukharin, personally transmitted by Orakhelashvili during Bukharin’s visit to Tbilisi in the summer of 1928 ... ”***

The prehistory was as follows...

On May 17, 1937, the Politburo decided to put to a vote by the Central Committee the question of expelling Mamiya Orakhelashvili from the members of the Audit Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and Shalva Eliava from candidates for members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and both from the party, with expulsion from Moscow on charges of links with the Georgian Trotskyist center.

Orakhelashvili was deported to Astrakhan, and on June 26 he was arrested and transferred to Tbilisi. Eliava, a Bolshevik since 1904, was also arrested. On July 20, 1937, Beria informed Stalin about the progress of the investigation. And it, this consequence, with all the outward unimaginability of what Beria wrote about, showed that resentment and ambition are a bad line of conduct for politicians working for the people. At first they saw an enemy in Stalin, then they agreed to an alliance with Stalin's enemies. And in the end they came to a camp hostile to the people. Beria has always been and remained with Stalin. At the end of the note dated July 20, he wrote, in particular: ***“Anti-Soviet and kr. elements on Georgia will be thoroughly withdrawn. About 200 people have already been shot. Recently, through the NKVD of Georgia, comrade. Yezhov was sent materials for an***

I think that at least 1,000 people will have to be shot, from among the K.-R., rightists, Trotskyists, spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and so on. This number does not include former kulaks and criminals who returned from exile and are subject to administrative execution through a troika created under the NKVD of Georgia in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. <...> I ask for your

instructions. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia L. Beria. Administrative execution was first used in the 20th century not in the USSR - with the outbreak of World War I, the prefect of Paris arrested, according to operational police data, about a thousand of the most active and dangerous

in the ditch of Vincennes. Without the red tape of the court and investigation! As the French say: "A la guerre comme a la guerre" - "In war, as in war." And Soviet Russia, having found itself in the position of a besieged fortress after October 1917, remained in the same position by 1937, and by no means of its own accord.

On OCTOBER 30, 1937, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Beria, sent a note to Stalin, which reported that over the past year, the NKVD of Georgia had arrested more than 12,000 people, of which 7,347 were convicted. And from this closed note by Beria it clearly followed that not mythical enemies were arrested in Georgia, but real ones. Everything is understandable - when the general cleaning begins, it always takes more effort than expected, and there is so much garbage that one has only to wonder - where did it come

from? On January 31, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution approving an additional number of "former kulaks, criminals and an active anti-Soviet element" subject to repression, while in the Georgian SSR the limit for category I - "execution" was increased by 1,500 people (in execution cited, by the way, not all sentences). With this in mind, the number of those sentenced to VMN in Georgia during the repressions of 1937-38 can be estimated at 6-7 thousand people (according to Khrushchev's estimates - 8 thousand people). In today's Georgia, the figure is raised to 15,000 people. This is a "liberal" lie, but so be it. Was it a lot or a little - for Georgia specifically, specifically at the end of the 1930s? Well, let's think and estimate ...

Georgia was the only republic of the USSR, headed by ardent anti-Soviet mensheviks for so long - until 1921. Moreover, the number of Georgian Mensheviks at one time reached **80 thousand people**. The majority of the then national intelligentsia was associated with the Menshevik Party. In 1921, Lenin declared that of the

Mensheviks who joined the party after 1918, "no more than one hundredth of a share should be left in the party, and even then, checking each one left three times and four times." And then he explained that the Mensheviks "proved during the period 1918-1921 two of their properties: to skillfully adapt,

cling to the prevailing trend among the workers; the second is to serve even more skillfully faithfully to the White Guard, to serve it in deed, ***renouncing it in words*** (bold italics here and below mine, - S.K.) ... "Lenin's words were applicable to the Georgian Mensheviks, perhaps, to a much greater extent than to the Russians.

And here is what Stalin said on December 4, 1920, in an interview with Pravda after returning from the south: "... Georgia, which has become the ***main base of the imperialist operations of England and France***, ... is now living out the last days of its life. It is not for nothing that the decaying leader of the dying Second International, Mr. Kautsky, found shelter ... with the bankrupt Georgian social-spirit makers ... "

On February 25, 1921, the 11th Army, led by Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, entered Tiflis, and Georgia of the Menshevik social dukhans ended as a state entity. But their influence was still considerable. At the end of June 1921, Stalin arrived in already Soviet Georgia and on July 6 delivered a report at the general meeting of the Tiflis organization of the Communist Party of Georgia. Stalin noted then that if before the revolution "... the bonds of brotherhood bound the Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Russian workers into one socialist family," now, upon arrival in Tiflis, he "was struck by the lack of former solidarity."

"Nationalism has developed among the workers and peasants," Stalin stated, "... The old bonds of fraternal trust have been broken or, at least, greatly weakened. ***Obviously, three years of existence of nationalist governments*** in Georgia..., in Azerbaijan..., in Armenia... ***were not in vain.***" And a nationalist is automatically an anti-Soviet, and

automatically, at least, an accomplice of the West. Often - his direct agent, especially if we mean educated nationalists from among the "clean" public. At the same time, Stalin warned of the danger of an influx of "intellectual-petty-bourgeois nationalist

elements" into the Communist Party of Georgia and urged "not to chase after the number of party members", fighting against the infestation of any, according to Stalin, "petty-bourgeois rubbish that kills ... the living spirit."

Beria did not force the growth of the party, but growth was forced before him, and for the time being, this had to be put up with. As a result

The Communist Party of Georgia, even under Beria, by 1937 was something like a hodgepodge, where, in addition to honest communists, there were enough enemies. And it was not only former Mensheviks with party cards of the CPSU (b) who kept a fiddle, or even a knife, in their pocket against Soviet power! There were Trotskyists - in the Communist Party of Georgia there were **about 3 thousand of them, who seemed to be "former", but in reality by no means always "former"**. There were "rightists" - supporters of Rykov and Bukharin. There were former princes and their lackeys in Georgia... Former merchants and kulaks... Stupid intellectual nationalists - especially vicious because of inescapable stupidity... There were vulgar thieves and self-seekers - party and non-party. There were more than one thousand former bandits, because banditry - criminal and political, was outlived in mountainous Georgia for a long time and not easy. Plus - numerous agents of all the major Western powers, recruited before 1917 and after 1917: British agents, Polish, American ..~~Turkish~~, the political agents of German, Italian, and other emigrant circles.

En masse, this audience was drawn to a good **three or four tens of thousands** (if not more!) of current or potential members of the "fifth column". And things were heading for war - this was understood by those who built and strengthened Soviet power, and those who would be glad to destroy it and were ready to destroy it, which could become possible only as a result of a new external intervention. Moreover, in the Caucasus, the anti-Soviet could count on the Anglo-French aggression against the USSR. In the spring of 1940, the Anglo-French directly planned both air bombardments of Baku and an invasion of the Soviet Transcaucasus. In any case, Baku oil, in the event of war, would be the first to be threatened by sabotage and sabotage.

Knowing and understanding all the potential severity of the situation in the Caucasus, one can only be surprised that the number of repressed (it was, of course, significantly lower than the "liberal" figure) in Beria's Georgia turned out to be less than could be expected based on objective conditions. The explanation for this is most likely to be found precisely in the Beria factor. Firstly,

the real Beria was not a "sadist" and "bloodthirsty maniac." On the contrary, he knew very well that human blood is not water, and it is criminal to pour it in vain. Repressive (yes, repressive!)

Beria's policy has always proceeded from this principle. Secondly, **Beria was the only one of the first political figures of the national republics who was able to prepare and carry out the repressions of 1937-1938 in the republic competently, professionally, without those notorious "chips" that fly from under an inept ax when cutting "forest"**. Beria thoroughly and thoroughly knew "shadow", underground, anti-Soviet, opposition, zakordonno-spy and simply criminal and selfish Georgia. I knew because this "dark" Georgia, hostile to Soviet power, supplied the main "clientele" of the GruzChK and ZakGPU, which Beria headed for almost ten years. Therefore, he was able to ensure the maximum "pointedness" of repressions, their exact personal orientation against those who really needed to be, one way or another, removed from the life of sunny Georgia, so that all sorts of riffraff would not cover its sky with black clouds. The accuracy of addressing Beria's repressions in Georgia was convincingly confirmed during the war - the Germans did not have any significant "fifth column" in Georgia, despite the exceptional strategic importance of this region.

Since 1937, the scope of Beria's state activity has formally declined, since, under the new Constitution, the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian SSRs became directly part of the USSR. In early December 1936, the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) was abolished, and from December 5, 1936, Beria remained only the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. To some extent, the lack of workload was compensated by the fact that since May 1937, Beria was also elected the 1st Secretary of the Tbilisi City Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, but still, the potential of such a powerful worker as Beria was far from being fully

demanding. And it was not in a businesslike way. The first half of 1938, Beria was busy, as always, with the affairs of the republic. Having freed himself from the need to distribute his attention and time between the three republics since the beginning of last year, in 1937 he "rushed" especially powerfully, and the results were evident everywhere - in industry, in construction and agriculture, in culture. Georgia overfulfilled the second fi

indicators. The volume of industrial production from 1929 to 1939 increased more than five times, and in comparison with 1913 - more than fifteen times! Railways were electrified, new enterprises were built. Tea plantations were expanding, in the future they were preparing to harvest not hundreds of millions of lemons and tangerines, but billions from citrus trees. More than two thousand tractors worked on the fields of the republic. Beria worked enthusiastically in Tbilisi, but Stalin in Moscow already had his own views on him.

At DIFFERENT times, different versions of why Stalin took Beria to Moscow were put forward. But, most likely, Stalin decided that Beria was needed in Moscow simply because Beria was no longer needed in Transcaucasia. Beria was transferred to the post of First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, that is, along the old line - the KGB. The urgent need to clear the "Augean stables" in the NKVD - and no one could have done this better than Beria - probably also influenced Stalin's decision. But in any case, Beria had to look for a field of activity much wider than what he had since 1937. Lavrenty Beria became more needed in

Moscow, and from the end of the summer of 1938, Beria's activities until the end of his life acquired an all-Union scale. All his further work took place in the capital of the USSR.

During the years of leadership of the Transcaucasus, Beria as a leader and organizer, of course, has grown. The volume of his versatile knowledge has also grown - the management of living concrete affairs and communication with prominent specialists forms an intelligent person no worse than a university, and Beria was an intelligent and inquisitive person. Later, his ability to quickly grasp the essence of the new and learn was noted even by such a person, not disposed to him, as academician Kapitsa.

Transcaucasia is the most important huge region. For a competent coverage of all its problems, a person of great statesmanship and outstanding qualities is needed. But Georgia?.. In Georgia of the 1938 model, everything was more or less adjusted. The republic was developing steadily, young national cadres could already work effectively in politics, and in the economy, and in science, and in culture. So the future

the best manager of the twentieth century, Beria, in one, and even very prosperous - through his own efforts - republic became crowded. Could

Stalin not understand this, who long ago said that "cadres decide everything" and who knew how to value and promote cadres?

Of course

not! So the correct explanation - why in the summer of 1938 Beria was transferred to Moscow, is that Beria "outgrew" the regional level and he had to select work at the all-Union level. What? The answer to this question was prompted

to Stalin

by life itself.

Fourth victory 1939-1941. Reform of the NKVD: from conspiracies to the state secret service

On AUGUST 21, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted two

decisions related to the NKVD of the USSR: "To predetermine the appointment of Comrade Frinovsky as the People's Commissar of the Navy with his release from the duties of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Approve as First Deputy People's Commissar
Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Beria.

The issue of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia should be resolved within three days and invite Comrade Beria to submit a candidate for approval by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "

So Lavrenty Beria was again returned to the KGB path, but in a higher quality and with new tasks. On September 9, 1938, by a resolution of the Politburo, he was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank. And on November 25, 1938, Beria became People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, replacing Nikolai Yezhov, General Commissar of State Security of the USSR, as People's Commissar.

Without dwelling in detail on the double replacement of Beria, first Frinovsky, and then Yezhov, nevertheless, I will say that at first Stalin might not have planned to replace Yezhov with Beria. The expediency and even the absolute necessity of this became clearer gradually.

One way or another, from the end of 1938, Beria stood at the head of the most important people's commissariat. And already in the first year of the leadership of the NKVD, the new People's Commissar fundamentally changed the essence of the Soviet public security body! The active and effective reformer of Georgia proved to be no less active and effective reformer of the Soviet special services. The reform consisted, first of all, in the fact that Beria

decisively put an end to the "political" OGPU-NKVD, which not only ensured the security of the state, but also turned out to be


a source of potential state conspiracies and a bearer of the spirit of "world revolution". In the NKVD, the model of his first People's Commissar **Yagoda**, the tone was often set by figures like Artuzov-Frauchi, a man of no talent, but self-confident and not without sybarism, or adventurers like the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Alexander Uspensky. Enough in the pre-Beria NKVD and corruption, and exaggerated "intelligence" "information", and falsification of investigative cases, not to mention the staunch Trotskyist and "right" darling. Beria, put at the head of the people's commissariat, recreated the NKVD as a purely **state** body, carrying out those tasks and solving those tasks that the top state leadership sets for the special service. **It can be said in short: a semi-amateur organization, prone to politicking and conspiracies, Beria transformed into a professional intelligence service.** Dzerzhinsky considered the Cheka and

then the OGPU as a political body, and not only (and not so much) as a special service of the state. Actually, the abbreviation of the GPU itself is formed by the first letters of the name "Main Political Directorate". And for those years, everything here was true. In addition, Dzerzhinsky, like the later Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky, were major Bolshevik politicians - major not only in terms of their position in the party even before the revolution, but major in essence. They were able to think like politicians and look at the processes in society like Marxist politicians.

Yagoda, who replaced Menzhinsky, was politically a figure of absolutely different caliber than his predecessors in the leadership of the Cheka-OGPU, but (sic!) He claimed political roles! And this was not only Yagoda in the OGPU - the same Artuzov, Frinovsky, Evdokimov, and many others! In 1934, the United Main **Political** Directorate of the USSR was transformed into the People's Commissariat **of Internal Affairs** of the USSR. The name has changed, but the people have remained the same! With **political** ambitions!



Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet politician, head of a number of people's commissariats, founder and head of the Cheka



Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda (1891-1938) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet statesman and politician, one of the main leaders of the Soviet state security agencies (VChK, GPU, OGPU, NKVD), People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1934-1936)



Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (1895-1940) - Soviet party and statesman, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1936-1938)

The growing and powerfully developing country no longer needed a political emergency organization, but a normal, effective special service. And the Soviet state did not even have it in the second half of the 1930s. More precisely, it was, but not to the extent required! Among other things, in the OGPU and then by inheritance in the NKVD of the USSR, there were enough, as already mentioned, people of an adventurous warehouse, tempered from their youth by the ups and downs of the revolution and civil war, but by the maturity of adventurism have not become obsolete.

All this had to be dealt with, and even for the old Chekist Beria, this was not an easy task.

IN GENERAL, the overdue purge of the NKVD was started by Yezhov, who replaced Yagoda. From October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 5,229 employees left the state security agencies. 1,200 of them were arrested, but not all were convicted (see Svobodnaya Mysl magazine, No. 6, 1997). 5,359 people arrived at the authorities. And the very composition of the new Chekists proved that Stalin needed in the NKVD not bone-breakers, but educated people with high moral qualities - they recruited mainly young specialists with higher and secondary specialized education. Nikolai Yezhov is now

presented as almost a half-wit, but speeches by no means a fool were recorded by the transcript of Yezhov's speech to young communists and Komsomol members mobilized for work in the NKVD on March 11, 1937. The people's commissar spoke in a free, not cheat-sheet manner, and said, for example, like this: "... we don't have enough intelligence culture. We cannot, for example, compare with the culture of British intelligence ... "

And so: "One more quality is obligatory for a Chekist, you must always think not only at work, but also in everyday life that you are people's intelligence, that they look at you as the most honest and best people who are assigned to this area of work. At work and at home, you need to be distinguished by some qualities of an advanced Soviet person ... "

And so: "... you have to be conspirators, not talk ... I know, for example, from different Chekists, at least 15 options for capturing Savinkov, but in general, these options, each of them partially, reveal something in our work ... »

And so: "I am for awareness, but we do not need awareness (of the internal state of Soviet society — **S.K.**) in such a massive scale, it must be skillfully used and skillfully arranged ... This is, firstly, secondly, it must be scary be careful with the materials of this network ... Our informants are not all that well qualified people. If you look at some of their reports, it is sometimes quite difficult to understand what is written there ... "



At the construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal in 1937. Left to right: Deputy deputy head of the NKVD of the USSR and at the same time head of the Gulag M. D. Berman, I. V. Stalin, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N. I. Yezhov and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov

And at the end, Yezhov warned the newcomers: "Finally... — The Constitution, comrades. With the introduction of the Constitution, many of our things that we are now doing casually (*laughter in the audience*), they will not be in vain. There is legality, so we need to know our laws... then all relationships with the prosecutor's office will disappear. Our main fight with the Prosecutor's Office so far goes simply along the line of ignorance ...

procedural norms, that is, it goes along the line of trifles, because ... if a political fight breaks out, then it will definitely go to the Central Committee.

It was not Cicero's speech, but it was the speech of an intelligent professional, a man of no small statesmanship. Not everything that the people's commissar called on young NKVD recruits to do, he himself corresponded to, but he said sensible, true things. Alas, Yezhov got confused, and it was not easy to sort out all this "mess", but Beria is Beria - he figured it out. Although, of course, not immediately.

MURDERED in 1953, Beria fell out of the public eye for almost forty years. By the end of the 1980s, he again returned to focus, but as a kind of personification of the "Stalinist bloody totalitarian regime", "executioner", "monster", "ghoul". The real Beria, having come to the NKVD, in a short time initiated a massive re-examination of investigative cases. The result was the release of more than 300,000 people from camps and colonies. This process continued later, and even "liberals" write about the "Beria thaw." Due to the complexity of the then political and social situation, the repressive process

captured many of those who were either innocent or not guilty according to the prescribed punishment. It was Beria who had to deal with this, and his very appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was regarded **by contemporaries** as a harbinger of major **positive** changes. But to restore trampled justice is a worthy matter, but not the most difficult. Organizing sustainably effective work is a more difficult task. A difficult task is a task for Beria. And - let's not forget, for the cadres he selected and brought up earlier, as well as - selected and

re-educated.

Having become an effective **systemic** reformer of the NKVD, Beria transformed the political body, prone to slipping into politicking, into a special service that the state needed. It was, however, a systemic reform, on the principles of which Beria carried out a number of **specific** organizational and structural reforms, giving the NKVD of the USSR a qualitatively stronger professional image.

In March 1938, Yezhov reorganized the structure of the NKVD. One of the major dubious innovations was the downgrading of the status of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) to just Directorate. On the other hand, there have been positive developments in the organization of the production activities of the NKVD and the control of the economy. However, only with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, the last process quickly reached its logical conclusion. Negative ideas were just as quickly handed over to the archive.

On August 21, Beria was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD, on September 9 he was awarded the rank of commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, and already on September 13, 1938 - formally according to Yezhov's note, but really according to Beria's outlines - the Politburo approves the new organizational structure of the NKVD. In the NKVD system, three new headquarters were formed: the Main Directorate of State Security - GUGB, the Main Economic Directorate - GEM, and the Main Transport Directorate - GTU.

The State Security Directorate restored the lost status of the Main Directorate, and Beria stood at the head of the GUGB. The GEM and GTU were called upon to control the work of the economy and transport **and provide the country's leadership with objective information about the situation there.** By 1940, the GEM included the following departments: industry; defense industry; Agriculture; Goznak and refineries; aviation industry; fuel industry. GTU had branch departments for railway transport, water transport; communications, highway construction, civil air fleet. Ten days later, on September 23, 1938, the Politburo, by changing the resolution of September 13, approves the purely "Beria" structure of the NKVD of the USSR, which later only improved. So, in February-March

1939, the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops was divided into six Main Directorates, chiefs: the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR; Main Directorate of the troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the protection of railway facilities; Main Directorate of the troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises; Main Directorate of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR; Main Military Supply Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR and the Main Military Construction Directorate of the Troops of the NKVD of the USSR. This improved the controllability of the troops, expanded their capabilities

training and development. As a result, those tasks were effectively solved, each of which had its own specifics, but which, before Beria, were dumped into a common

“heap”. **In the new structure of the NKVD of the USSR of the 1939 model, Beria also introduced - which is usually forgotten - an independent Bureau for receiving and considering complaints.** A fact that speaks for itself. The creation of such a Bureau in the most beneficial way contributed to the effectiveness of the return rehabilitation process, which began in 1939, continued throughout 1940, and did not end even in 1941. At the beginning of 1940, Beria

also achieved the adoption of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of January 28, 1940 No. 140 "On Approval of the Regulations on the Main Archival Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR." In fact, he carried out an effective reform of archiving in the USSR. The old Soviet archivists remembered Beria's words that without documents there are no archives, without archives there is no history, and without history there is no future.

THE PROBLEM of the structure of an organization is always and everywhere extremely important, because, ultimately, there are only two types of structure: a) allowing you to work effectively and b) not allowing you to work effectively. And here is a clear example of two approaches to business. In April 1937, the new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov, who became him six months ago, sent Stalin a detailed letter asking him to approve the draft resolution on the formation of the Investigative Department of the GUGB. This thought was correct, long overdue, and Yezhov noted that a new department must be created within three months. However, Yezhov did not achieve the realization of his own idea until the end of his tenure as people's

commissar. Beria, a month after his appointment as People's Commissar, in a short letter to Stalin (No. 109785 of December 22, 1938) substantiated the need to organize the Investigative Unit of the NKVD of the USSR. And **on the same day** it was organized by order of the NKVD of the USSR No.

00813. As you can see, there are people's commissars, and there are people's commi



Police photograph by Ignatius Reiss (1899–1937).

From 1927 to 1929, through the Soviet military intelligence, he was engaged in the creation of an illegal residency in the UK. From 1932 to 1937 he was in France



Walter Germanovich Krivitsky (1899–1941) —
high-ranking officer of the Soviet military intelligence, in 1934–
1937 led illegal residency in Western Europe



Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov (1895-1973) - Soviet intelligence officer, major of state security (1935). Illegal resident in France, Austria, Italy (1933–1937), resident of the NKVD and adviser to the republican government on security in Spain (1937–1938)



Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov (1900-1945) - a prominent figure in the Soviet special services, commissar of state security of the 3rd rank. In 1937-1938 - head of the NKVD department for the Far East

However, the structure is the structure, and the work is carried out by personnel. Here, Yezhov left behind not only a bad legacy - that party Komsomol set, before which Yezhov spoke on March 11, 1937, for the most part was useful to Beria, and he brought him up well in his own style - businesslike and active. And in December 1938, a new recruitment was carried out in the NKVD among politically proven and advanced production workers in Moscow. Then 1500 people were selected. Strong engineering personnel were recruited to the production headquarters of the NKVD, since the expansion of the production activities of the NKVD of the USSR required competent leaders. In 1939, 7,372 operational workers (22.9% of their total composition) were dismissed from the NKVD system, and 14,506 people were hired for operational security work, of which 11,062

party and Komsomol vouchers. Intelligent engineers, having come to the Beria NKVD, quickly grew under the hand of Beria into the heads of organizations, were part of the leadership of the Main Directorates.

The personnel problem also had a "national" aspect: Yagoda brought the "Jewish" percentage in the NKVD personnel to figures that were completely indecent. Yezhov significantly reduced the percentage of Jews in the leadership of the People's Commissariat. Beria further reduced this percentage: as of July 1, 1939, among the 153 senior officials of the NKVD there were 102 Russians, 19 Ukrainians and 6 Jews. But it was not about "anti-Semitism" - Beria valued people not by the points of the questionnaire, but by business qualities, therefore, in 1940, 189 Jews (6%) continued to work in the central apparatus of the NKVD.

Yezhov was let down not so much by his own cadres as by the inherited cadres of Yagoda, with whom Yezhov did not fully understand, especially at the leadership level. Beria, on the other hand, quickly completed the "cleansing" of the NKVD, driving out the stupid and shooting or imprisoning the guilty. And he immediately led a number of his experienced employees in Transcaucasia to the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR: V.N. Merkulova, B.Z. Kobulova, P.A. Sharia, V.G. Dekanozova, S.R. Milstein, I.I. Maslennikova, S.S. Mamulova...

It is characteristic that Beria, having previously worked not in the Center, but in the region, trained personnel in the Caucasus of such a level that, after being appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he could without hesitation take more than a dozen people with him to Moscow. Take it not just for your own convenience, but because they met the requirements of the central apparatus.

Having prepared positions, it was possible to begin real work, because the main task of the "organs" was not to cleanse their own ranks, but to ensure state security - intelligence and counterintelligence, the fight against sabotage and sabotage, border protection, protection of especially important objects, government communications ... Under the jurisdiction of the NKVD there were also police, fire and forest guards, even the Civil Status Department with a network of registry offices ...

A number of very objective works have been written today about how the GEM, GTU and the production headquarters of the NKVD worked, informative collections of documents have been published. GEM and GTU under Beria became a true "sovereign's eye", while cooperating with the People's Commissariat

state control. However, let us dwell on one of those aspects of the re-creation of the NKVD of the USSR by Beria, which is especially characteristic of the effective special service of the

state - intelligence. The state of the NKVD intelligence when Beria came there was depressing: not only were fictitious, exaggerated "residences" created behind the cordon, often simply misinforming the top leadership, including Stalin, but shortly before Beria's arrival, one after another, three obvious most **serious** "puncture." At first, the captain of the GB Ignatius Reiss (Nathan Poretsky) changed. Previously, Reiss-Poretsky worked in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, in 1931 he moved to the intelligence of the OGPU - the Foreign Department (INO). In 1937, he was recalled to Moscow, but he did not return, and on July 17 he published an open letter in French newspapers with "denunciations"

of Stalin and joined Trotsky. In September 1937, Reiss liquidated a special group of the NKVD near Lausanne, but then the second betrayal arrived. In the autumn of 1937, the captain of the GB, an illegal resident in Holland, Walter Krivitsky (Samuel Ginsberg), became a traitor and defector. This one also went into all serious trouble, contacted Trotsky's son Lev Sedov, but most importantly, he "surrendered" the Intelligence Service to more than a

hundred of our intelligence officers and agents. The betrayals of Reiss and Krivitsky inflicted much more damage on intelligence than all the "bloody repressions" of Yezhov, and in addition, in July 1938, Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbing, known in the NKVD and as Lev Nikolsky) also changed. The senior major of the GB (almost a general!) Orlov knew a lot. He was a resident of the NKVD in France, Austria, Italy, an adviser in Spain (he fled from Spain to the USA). It is believed that Orlov saved his life due to the fact that in a letter addressed to Yezhov he assured that he would not "hand over" agents. But only naive people can

To Spain, Orlov-Feldbing, in fact, saving him from a scandal, was sent by his close friend Abram Slutsky, head of the INO NKVD under Yagoda. The fact was that in August 1936, right in front of the Lubyanka building, a young employee of the NKVD, Galina Voitova, Feldbing's mistress, shot herself. She could not bear the fact that he left her, refusing to divorce his wife. Such was our "reconnaissance" then ...

If we put into the total account the betrayal of Genrikh Lyushkov, who fled to Manchuria on June 13, 1938, the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory, the commissioner of the 3rd rank State Security Service, then the picture of the decomposition of Yagoda-Yezhov's personnel is impressive. Beria had to deal with the consequences. The People's Commissariat as a whole turned Beria from a politicking body into a government body, into the special service of the USSR. But the same happened with intelligence - **it would not be an exaggeration to say that Beria created the Soviet foreign intelligence as a state institution.** Instead of the former "warm get-together" often talented - no doubt! - adventurers, instead of the "intelligence of the Comintern", through the efforts of Lavrenty Beria, the country received a reliable, constantly developing and improving intelligence agency. Scouts

planned selected, prepared, ~~old~~ "legend" and equipped. At the same time, Beria did not "destroy" the old frames, as it is attributed to him - he intelligently and quickly checked them, weeded out the dubious ones, and again sent the healthy part of the "frame" beyond the cordon. Beria knew how to check, but he also knew how to trust - the same story of the young intelligence officer Korotkov illustrates this well. At first, Korotkov was expressed distrust, and he addressed a letter personally to the people's commissar. Soon Korotkov was already working in Berlin, he worked effectively, and later became one of the leaders of foreign intelligence.

Many, to this day, are convinced that Beria allegedly "defeated" our intelligence, while he, in fact, if not founded, then effectively recreated it.

HERE IS ANOTHER forgotten and unappreciated merit of Beria - his role in introducing long-distance high-frequency (HF) government communications into the state practice of the USSR, reliably protected from eavesdropping and interception. Officially, this type of communication dates back to June 1, 1931, when a corresponding unit was created in the OGPU of the USSR, but only with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD did the rapid introduction of high-frequency communications into public administration begin.

Of course, his arrival coincided with a number of serious technical achievements in this area, but Beria's energy and his ability to understand the potential of high-frequency communications gave her a new impetus for development. Immediately after his appointment as People's Commissar, Lavrenty Pavlovich ordered a thorough check of the state of affairs, and already in the winter of 1939, his first deputy V.N. Merkulov submitted a memorandum, which noted that "due to the unsystematic organization, there is a dispersion of technical forces, irrational use of materials," etc.

subscribers increased by one and a half times and amounted to 430 numbers. By July 1940, there were 103 communication lines, by April 1, 1941 - 116 HF stations and 729 subscribers.



Shift technician of the central RF station E.A. Krylovich carries out maintenance work on the station equipment. Mid 30s

Каганович Л. М.	каб. СНК	32
Каганович Л. М.	каб.	
	НКНефть	33
Каганович Л. М.	каб.	
	НКПС	32
Каганович Л. М.	кв.	33
Круглов	каб.	35
Кузнецов	каб.	26
Кулик	каб.	22
Лихачев	каб.	32
Локтионов	каб.	22
Маленков	каб.	21
Маленков	кв.	34
Малышев	каб.	23
Маслеников	каб.	22
Мехлис	каб.	23
Микоян А. И.	каб. СНК	24
Микоян А. И.	каб. НКВД	25
Микоян А. И.	кв.	22

4

Меркулов	каб.	345
Меркулов	кв.	316
Молотов В. М.	каб. СНК	234
Молотов В. М.	каб. НКВД	220
Молотов В. М.	кв.	256
Папанин	каб.	221
Пересыпкин	каб.	263
Поскребышев	каб.	243
Ровинский	каб. редакции	
„Правда“		361
Рогов	каб.	354
Смородинов	каб.	259
Смушкевич	каб.	255
Сталин И. В.	каб.	233
Сталин И. В.	кв.	230
Хрущев Н. С.	каб.	349
Хрущев Н. С.	кв.	254
Чернышов	каб.	240
Шапошников	каб.	212

5

Subscribers of the Kremlin PBX in the "List of subscribers of government high-frequency communications (HF communications)", published by the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. 1940

Only stupid and lazy shoemakers go without boots, but Beria was neither stupid nor lazy. Therefore, the governmental high-frequency communications of the NKVD of the USSR also widely served the NKVD of the USSR itself. Beria periodically returned to the topic of high-frequency communications and paid constant attention to it during the war. And those principles of the approach to the organization of closed communication lines that he introduced have not been archived to this day.

It is impossible to cover all aspects of Beria's reform activities in the NKVD in a small book. But let's take, for example, the sniper movement ... Beria himself shot very decently, and ensured that his subordinates shot at least as well. As a result, snipers were not trained in the Red Army in the same way as they were trained in the NKVD of Beria - in such a massive and mandatory manner. But even in the attack, not to mention the trench warfare in the defense, the average

the hands of a sniper cost at least a dozen ordinary fighters, and an excellent

one cost fifty! Later, during the war, NKVD snipers were periodically sent on front-line missions, and the results of their combat work were such that army commanders, by hook or by crook, tried to keep them longer, although they themselves were too lazy to train snipers on such a scale.

But the most outstanding, and simply great, result of Beria's activity as a reformer of the NKVD was the new border troops with effective reconnaissance of the border troops. They strongly rescued the country in the most difficult first days of the war. And this was the fifth great victory of Lavrenty Beria for the glory of the Socialist Fatherland.

Fifth victory

1939–1941. Border shield of the Motherland

The FIGURE of a border guard in the USSR, Stalin, was popular, comparable to the popularity of pilots. The pre-war Moscow metro station Ploshchad Revolyutsii is decorated with statues of young boys and girls, personifying the generations for which the October Revolution was made: pilots, Red Navy men, students, workers and collective farmers, miners... There is also a bronze border guard with a watchdog. Today, the muzzle of the dog is polished to a mirror shine - it has become fashionable to touch it "for good luck." The border guard in the metro is the legendary Nikita Karatsyupa, and the dog is the no less legendary Hindu, whose nickname was once known to all the boys of the Soviet Union.

Karatsyupa and his comrades-in-arms, who guarded the Soviet borders, became the pride of the people even before Beria came to the leadership of the NKVD, but it was Beria who gave the NKVD border troops not only new glory, but also new power! Beria did not create the border troops, but he recreated them, as well as intelligence.

Let's pick up a weighty volume of documents "The Border Troops of the USSR. 1039 - June 1941", published in 1970 jointly by the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Political Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR. Eight hundred and seven documents... Hundreds, if not thousands of names - from ordinary border guards to deputies of the people's commissar... But looking for the name of the people's commissar here is a waste of time! It became a taboo for the Khrushchevites and remained a taboo for the Brezhnevites. And if there is no signature under the document with the heading "Communication of the NKVD to the central authorities", then it is clear: the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Commissar of State Security of the USSR Beria signed the document. And the requisite itself "Message of the NKVD to the central authorities" must be deciphered as: "Beria to Stalin."



Nikita Karaputsa and Ingus guarding the state border. 1936



Monument to the famous border guard and his shepherd at the metro station "Revolution Square" in Moscow



Nikita Fedorovich Karatsupa (1910-1994) - Hero of the Soviet Union, colonel of the border service



The first issue of the magazine "Pogranichnik". 1939

Beria, a reformer of the border troops, was silenced especially carefully. And this despite the fact that no one, neither before nor after Beria, did as much for the border troops as he did. He did not in the sense that he fed the border guards with pies and crumpets, but in the sense that the organizational decisions and ideas of Beria and those whom he attracted to the restructuring of the border troops created a powerful and formidable mechanism from the border troops. The Soviet Guard of the Red Army was born during the war, in the autumn of 1941. But already before the war, the Soviet Union ha

and the glorious guards - the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR. This became clear from the very first hours of the Great Patriotic War. In general, it will not be an exaggeration to say that **Beria's reforms determined the general appearance of the Soviet border troops for**

decades! Publishers of the Orders of the NKVD of the USSR 1934-1941 published in the series "Catalogues" in Novosibirsk note that two-thirds of the orders of People's Commissar Beria for the troops concern the border troops of the NKVD. Moreover, there were such orders as "On the allocation of an additional 150 horses to the disposal of the GUPV", that is, these were specific, business instructions, and not "cardboard" dummies.

Every week, Beria was presented with reports on the political morale of the border troops, signed by the head of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops, divisional commissar P.M. Mironenko. The results of the attention and care of the new people's commissar quickly showed up - not only the special, but also the purely military training of border guards grew. The best traditions of the Soviet border guards were laid down already in the 1920s-1930s, but Beria developed them, starting with the fact that in 1939 the magazine "Pogranichnik" began to be published, which quickly gained popularity.

An ideological weapon, however, is effective when backed up by an effective organization and appropriate material weapons. Beria was a brilliant manager in everything, so he approached the improvement of the organization of the protection of the state border in a comprehensive manner. And at the same time, he, a natural Chekist, did not forget about the organization of intelligence work in the border troops - this should be emphasized! In

1993, the book of retired Major General Sechkin "Border and War" was published, and this is what we find there: "In

February (1939, - **S.K.**) and Internal Troops was singled out as an independent Main Directorate of Border Troops. The creation of a special body with clearly and precisely defined tasks and district administrations on the ground had a favorable effect on the organizational strengthening of the border troops as special troops designed to guard and protect the state border of the USSR ...

During ... 1939 ... a complete reorganization of the units of the border troops was carried out; the headquarters of units and formations were reorganized according to a unified control scheme from top to bottom, ***reconnaissance bodies of units and formations of the border troops were also created according to a unified scheme*** (bold italics are mine everywhere - S.K.); all departments of commandant's offices were reorganized in two main model states (land and coastal), <...>, the existing communications units were formed and re-formed, <...>, motorization of transport units was carried out, <...> formed ... 7 naval schools, 7 schools of service dogs were re-formed and School of Communication. <...> The technical reconstruction of the troops, ***the re-equipment of the land border units with modern small arms ...*** the development of border aviation, ***the introduction of engineering and technical means into the protection of the border***, made increased demands on ... the training of commanding officers and political staff. <...>

By the beginning of 1941, command and engineering personnel for the border troops were being trained in 11 military educational institutions of the People's Commissariat of

Internal Affairs. There is not a word about Beria here either. But in everything described above, the handwriting of Lavrenty Pavlovich is visible: a clear structure, the development of technical means, training, reliable communications, motorization ... And - let's not forget - intelligence! Mass intelligence, at an extremely low level, intelligence conducted by ordinary people, by the people themselves, and therefore the most reliable and ***reliable!***

It is appropriate to call such reconnaissance "ant" - an individual ant carries a little, but in the end a huge anthill grows! The border detachments of the NKVD collected such intelligence information that the GUGB, together with the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army, could envy. And Beria's personal merit is paramount! He perfectly placed such intelligence back in the ZakChK, and then in the ZakOGPU, and he knew its significance for the effective protection of both borders and the security of the state, not in theory.

By the end of 1939, the border troops had changed. And their high quality was confirmed in the most obvious way - in battles during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

By the very nature of their functions, border guards should not fight like soldiers. The task of the border troops is to control and protect the border in

Peaceful time. And here - Beria's border guards fought, and how! By the end of 1939, their combat readiness was so good that in the "Finnish" war, which was replete with just the same criminal miscalculations of the army, the situation sometimes developed anecdotal. For example, the joint directive of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria No. 16662 dated September 14, 1939, that is, before the start of hostilities, it was provided that with their start, the border troops were operationally subordinate to the command of the Red Army until the Red Army units reached the line of 30–50 kilometers deep into Finnish territory. By mid-December 1939, many units of the 9th Army reached this line, but the military commanders still demanded that they be allocated to support units of the border troops. It ended up that on December 17, the chief of staff of the NKVD border troops of the Karelian district, Colonel Kiselyov, sent a report to the headquarters of the 9th Army, in which he tactfully but firmly reminded the army generals that the business of the border troops was to

protect the state border, and not break through a heavily fortified defense. Beria's border guards knew how not only to detain violators, but also to fight like field troops, and fought better than the army. And Beria made sure that the "green caps" were able to fight even better and fight with the best weapons. One of the unpleasant surprises of the "Finnish" war was the massive use of Suomi assault rifles by

the Finns. There were samples of them in the People's Commissariat of Defense even before the war, but in the course of hostilities both new captured assault rifles appeared and the opportunity to get an idea of their effectiveness in battle. However, none of the high military officials - neither the former People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Voroshilov, nor Marshal Timoshenko who replaced him, nor the Chief of Armaments of the Red Army, Marshal Kulik, nor the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov, appreciated the machine guns. Kulik believed that machine guns were "weapons of the police and gangsters," but Mosin's Russian three-ruler would not let you down. After the "Finnish" campaign

he did not change his mind.



Outfit of border guards on patrol. Karelian isthmus. 1939



Soviet border guard at the post at the outpost of the Finns
Beloostrov. 1939



Soviet border guards inspect captured Finnish weapons. 1939



Suomi-konepistooli \ddot{y} /-31, Suomi KP) is a Finnish submachine gun of the Aimo Lahti system. Was in service in Finland (since 1931) and a number of other countries, was used in the Soviet-Finnish War and the Great Patriotic War

Blaming, however, everything on Kulik is not worth it. In the "swamp" of the pre-war People's Commissariat of Defense and other "waders" there were enough, so the army did not make mass orders for industry for machine guns, although there were good domestic developments in the USSR. In 1940, with the well-established weapons production, the industry of the USSR produced only 81,000 submachine guns. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, they were urgently ordered to be made almost like bed workshops - factory production could not satisfy the needs of the army, which finally understood what it was in a maneuverable battle - machine guns!

But the correct conclusions long before the war were made by Comrade Beria, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And he ordered as many machine guns for the border troops as the cost estimate of the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops allowed. By the beginning of 1941, only in the Ukrainian border district were armed with 300 heavy machine guns, more than 600 light machine guns and quite a few machine guns. And besides -

about 500 cars - Beria did not forget about increasing the mobility of the border troops. Five

detachments of the Belarusian border district had 200 heavy machine guns, about 400 light machine guns, about 6.5 thousand self-loading rifles and 2.5 thousand machine guns.

In 1940, 3,515 submachine guns (machine guns), 1,200 self-loading rifles and 110 machine guns were additionally allocated to strengthen the fire capabilities of the frontier posts, and in March-April 1941, 357 RM-50 company mortars, 45 heavy machine guns and 18 anti-tank rifles. This was what General Sechkin called "re-equipment of land border units with modern small arms", while "forgetting" to mention that such rearmament was the result of the perspicacity of People's Commissar L.P. Beria. The relative saturation of the border troops with automatic

weapons before the war many times exceeded the army's indicators. And with the start of the war, the NKVD had to share its supplies with the army, although Beria's subordinates themselves needed them for battles with the same Germans!

Until now, many are sure that Stalin did not believe in the imminence of the war in 1941, and that he was dissuaded by Beria, who was in charge of Soviet intelligence. In reality, everything was different - exactly, as mathematicians say, "quite the opposite."



Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov (1895-1953) - Soviet statesman and politician. Head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR (1938–1941), People's Commissar (Minister) of State Security of the USSR (1941, 1943–1946)

Firstly, from February 3, 1941, Lavrenty Beria did not direct foreign intelligence, and Vsevolod Merkulov laid its data on the table for Stalin, because on February 3, the single people's commissariat - the NKVD, was divided into two separate people's commissariats - internal affairs and state security. The NKVD of the USSR was still led by Beria, and the new NKGB of the USSR was headed by his former first deputy and head of the GUGB Merkulov. Foreign intelligence remained, of course, in the NKGB, but this intelligence of Stalin a

the war was not very reassuring. As for Beria, he, not in charge of the foreign intelligence of the NKGB, had at his disposal the intelligence of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR. It was border intelligence, and among its informants there were no "cream of society", but train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest settlers and residents of border towns helped her behind the cordon ... They collected information like ants, and, put together, it gave the most objective picture of what is happening. The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was reflected in the notes of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria to Stalin. The following are, in extracts, three of them. So ... **"Memoir of the People's Commissar of Internal**

Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIA I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE S.K. TYMOSHENKO

ON THE TRANSFER OF THE GERMAN TROOPS TO THE SOVIET BORDER AND VIOLATION OF THE USSR AIRSPACE. "No. 1196/

B April 21, 1941 Top secret

From April 1 to April

19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the Governor General (Poland, - S.K.).

In the border zone of the Klaipeda region: Two infantry divisions, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, **a tank battalion** (bold print hereinafter mine - **S.K.**) and a company of bicycle riders arrived.

In the Suwalki-Lykk area: Up to two motorized mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, **tank and engineer battalions arrived**. In the

Myshinets-Ostrolenka area: Up to four infantry and one artillery regiments, **a tank battalion** and a motorcycle battalion arrived. <...> In the region of Biala

Podlaska: One infantry regiment, **two engineer battalions, a cavalry** squadron, a company of scooters and an artillery battery arrived. <...>

In the area of the city of Holm: Up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment and a **sapper battalion arrived. Over five hundred cars** are also concentrated there . <...> In the Tomashov region: The headquarters of the

formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and **up to three hundred tanks**, In the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav

region: We arrived before the infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments. <...>

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, squadron, battery, and **often at night**. In the same areas where the troops arrived, **a large amount of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles were delivered**. In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR **Beria** Such information was sent to Stalin regularly,

and it acquired an increasingly formidable and unambiguous meaning. So, on June 2, 1941, Beria personally sent a note to Stalin No. 1798 / B:

"<...> **Two army groups** concentrated in the areas of Tomashov and Lezhaysk . In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were identified: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanuv ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierz manor ..., commanded by General Reichenau (requires clarification). <...>

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and one hundred aircraft were delivered to the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) . <...> **Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border:** on May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of the town of Ulguwek ..., on May 18 - a general with a group of officers - in the Belzhets region ..., on May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in the Radymno area.

Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated in many points near the border. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov. <...> In addition, information was received

about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction of the borders with the USSR ... "

Three days later, on June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note (No. 1868/B) on the same subject:

"<...> May 20 of this year. in Byala Podlaska ... the location of the headquarters of the infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the **personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the**

headquarters of the tank formation are noted. In the Yanov-Podlyasky area, 33 km northwest of Brest, **pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges are concentrated.** <...>

May 31 at st. An echelon with tanks arrived in Sanok .<...>

> On May 20, up **to a hundred** aircraft.

<...> In the city of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the Khust area - German tank and motorized units.

<...> During May 21–24, they proceeded from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border: through st. Pashkans - **12 echelons of German infantry with tanks**; through st. Craiova - **two echelons with tanks**; at st. Three echelons of infantry arrived at Dormenashti and at st. Borshchov two echelons with heavy tanks and vehicles.

At the airfield in the Buzeu area ... **up to 250 German aircraft were noted.** <...>

In Dorokhoi Uyezd, the gendarmerie and local authorities offered the population to set up a bomb shelter near each house within five days. **The General Staff of**

the Red Army has been informed." Stalin had many objective reasons to doubt the reliability of the data of external, "salon", so to speak, intelligence. But the data of the "ant" intelligence of Beria could not be disinformation, and Stalin could not help but understand this.

The topic of the last pre-war week of June 1941 is beyond the scope of this book. But taking into account what we already know today, we can confidently say that it was not Stalin who missed the start of the war, but the highest generals in Moscow and in the districts. It seems that the "burp" of the Tukhachevsky-Yakir-Uborevich conspiracy also played its fatal significance ... As for Beria, as the head of the NKVD of the USSR, he first created - in the form of intelligence of the border districts - a mechanism for accurate mass information about possible external aggression, and then used the possibilities of this mechanism for accurate, complete and timely information from the top leadership, including Stalin, about the imminence and inevitability of this aggression in 1941.

Lavrenty Beria was at his best here too!

And THIS is about the border guards of Beria - not everything! **Transformed under the leadership of Beria, the border troops of the NKVD played in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War - in the border battle, not even an operational, but a strategic role**, because the disruption to the pace of the "blitzkrieg" was of strategic importance in the future. Namely, in this - in disrupting the pace, in knocking down arrogance from the Wehrmacht, Beria's border guards played an outstanding role, which no one demanded of them before the war. During 1939-40, the personnel of the border troops increased by 50%,

and at the beginning of 1941, allegedly "not preparing for war," Beria also seeks an additional increase in their numbers, bringing it to 100 thousand people on the western border within five border *military* districts : Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa.

There were eight **border** western districts: Murmansk, Karelian-Finnish, Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and Black Sea. It was a force, increased tenfold by the fact that it was united both in combat and in ideological terms. Moreover, 47% of the number of all Western border troops were concentrated in the Belarusian and Ukrainian border districts. It was not difficult to foresee the development of events, passing on to Stalin the information that Beria passed on to him. And could Beria not feel the pre-stormy atmosphere, knowing the statistics of violations of the western border? In the first quarter of 1940, among the border violators (and it was violated by both smugglers and godfathers on opposite sides of the border who decided to visit relatives), 28 German agents were exposed, in the second quarter - 43, in the third - 64, in the fourth - 99, and in the first quarter of 1941 - already 153.

Of course, Beria understood everything, and prepared the border troops in advance for close combat operations.



Soviet border guards. September 1939



Frontier guard with service dog

The border guards were better prepared for war than the army through the whole practice of their service. If the army daily shoots live ammunition only with the outbreak of war, then the border troops are always at war - for them the Great Patriotic War began long before June 22. In April 1941, at the site of the 86th border detachment, a reconnaissance group crossed the border - sixteen people dressed in the uniform of the engineering troops of the Red Army. After our border guards met with them, a uniform battle began. As a result, 11 saboteurs were killed, 5 were taken prisoner. This was not an isolated case - from April to November 1940, 38 gangs and armed emigrant groups totaling 486 people were liquidated in the Ukrainian border district alone! But in general, on the eve of the war, the border guards repelled more than 500 armed incursions into Soviet territory.

BORDER prepared for war in advance. In the monograph A.I. Chugunov "The border is fighting" about this it is said like this:

"As for the border outposts, commandant's offices and detachments, in a short (pre-war!, - **S.K.**) time they managed to equip light-type defensive structures: dugouts, trenches, communication passages, bunkers, trenches, which made it possible to create relatively strong knots resistance during the fighting on the front line. Would all this be possible without the sanction of People's Commissar

Beria? And would he have given this sanction if he had not seen the high probability of the outbreak of war as early as 1941? Communications and trenches are not equipped a year before the start of the war.

And this is how the border guards of Beria met the war - according to the testimony of the same A.I.

Chugunova: "The last night before the invasion for the border troops of the western and northwestern sectors was in fact no longer peaceful. On the evening of June 21, many (? - **S.K.**) outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments, by order of their superiors, left the barracks and occupied defensive structures prepared in case of hostilities. But who gave orders to the chiefs?

And what does "...many" mean? Such a responsible order as an order to take up combat positions in the evening could come to the outposts only from Moscow, from the people's commissariat. And only the Commissar himself could give such an order. And, of course, **for the entire** western strip of the border.

Moreover! On the night of June 21-22, 1941, Lieutenant-General Grigory Grigoryevich Sokolov, head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, was in the area of the 87th border detachment of the Belarusian border district - in the direction of the main attack of the Germans.



Soviet border guards on patrol. The picture was taken for one of the newspapers on June 20, 1941



Grigory Grigoryevich Sokolov (1904-1973) - Soviet military leader, lieutenant general (1940). From March 1939 to August 1941 - Head of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs and Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR



Monument to the border guards and their guard dogs of a separate battalion of the border detachment of the rear of the South-Western Front. On July 30, 1941, near the village of Legedzino, the battalion (500 border guards and 150 dogs) covered the retreat of the headquarters of the command of the Uman army group and resisted the Nazis with the last of their strength, who were advancing with a whole regiment. When the ammunition ran out, the battalion commander Lopatin gave the order to go hand to hand. All together: both people and dogs. Everyone died on the field near Legedzino: both border guards and dogs. No one was taken prisoner. The surviving dogs lay down near the bodies of their guides and fiercely defended them from the approaching Germans until the bullet stopped their hearts.

The main border guard of the country could not be at the border without a direct order from Beria and without the sanction of Stalin. Since it was clear to both of them that a difficult war would begin from day to day, Sokolov was needed right there, in Belarus, and was sent to the border zone for KGB participation in a close war. Already the fact that Beria sent to Belarus on the eve of the war the head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR

refutes the lie that Stalin and Beria did not believe in the imminence of the war, why they keep quiet about the mission of General Sokolov! But the truth is this: for the border troops, the war began in the trenches, and not in the beds, which is the merit, first of all, of Beria. And one experienced border soldier in a difficult, dynamic situation without a single front line, without a clear command, was worth, perhaps, five, or even ten, or even **fifty** ordinary conscripts.

The personnel of the border troops were almost without exception Party and Komsomol, and this was the true guard of the socialist Motherland - the purest, most perfect and exciting human result of the new, Soviet, system. Before the war, there were about one hundred thousand of them, young and older guys in green caps, guardsmen of Beria, on the western borders: 47 land and 6 sea border detachments, 9 separate border commandant's offices and 11 regiments of the operational troops of the NKVD. In the outbreak of the war, they immediately played a role, I repeat, without exaggeration, a strategic one! They kept **for days** in a situation in which army units would have rolled back in just hours.

The army met the war in different ways. In general - heroically, but often - mediocre, or even criminal. It is criminal, first of all, in relation to the command of different levels. The failures of part of the army led to a general failure. And the Soviet border guards, under the leadership of Comrade Beria, a member of the Lenin-Stalin Party, met the war with dignity. That is, like the Bolsheviks and Russian people - with their breasts!

For their combat commissar, the war began in Stalin's Kremlin office, when Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis and Zhukov entered at 5:45 on June 22. Later, at eight o'clock, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov came up. Ahead were 1418 days of a huge, Great War, culminating in a great Victory.

Sixth victory

1941–1943. Front organizer

ALREADY by the beginning of 1941, it became clear to Stalin that using Beria only as the head of the NKVD meant using him irrationally. Stalin's employees worked to the extent that Stalin himself worked, that is, as much as was necessary for the cause. Since there were always cases for twenty-five hours a day, it is clear how much Stalin's employees and associates worked. And Beria was also the most efficient. Nevertheless, the working day can be filled with different content, and from February 3, 1941, the distribution of Beria's duties has changed significantly. On this day, a single people's commissariat - the NKVD of the USSR, was divided into two separate people's commissariats: the NKVD of the USSR, which was still led by Lavrenty Beria, and the NKGB of the USSR - the people's commissariat of state security, headed by Vsevolod Merkulov. Accordingly, the republican people's commissariats were divided. At the same time, Beria's load ... increased, since, while remaining the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he was also appointed one of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR. Molotov was then the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and also the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, but on May 5, 1941, Stalin himself headed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. This once again proves that he was waiting for the war already in 1941. The state and political position of Beria in the top leadership of the USSR was finally determined as paramount. In the reference calendar for 1941, which was being prepared for publication and printed, of course, until the beginning of

1941, Beria received a separate article on the entire page, which reported that "Comrade. Beria is one of the most prominent leaders of the CPSU (b) and the closest disciples and associates of Comrade Stalin.

Since March 1939, Beria became a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and now his state status has also increased. However, in Stalin's USSR, this only meant that the level of responsibility and workload increased. Through the Council of People's Commissars, Beria oversaw

People's Commissariats of State Security, Forestry, Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Oil Industry and River Fleet People's Commissariat. Things went to war, Beria not only

understood this, he **knew** it. But no one expected that the war would start like this - inexplicably unsuccessful, tragic, catastrophic. Stalin met June 22, 1941 calmly - he prepared the country, its economy, its peoples and its Armed Forces a lot for war. But the fact that Minsk would be surrendered on the sixth day of the war, Stalin could not imagine in the most unfavorable development of events. An analysis of the reasons for the failure is also beyond the scope of a small book, but the closer you peer into those days, the more clearly one black, charred word rises in your thoughts: "Treason."

The betrayal was not total, but one traitor who secretly opened the gates of the fortress to the enemy was enough for the fortress, with all its preparedness and power, to fall. And the traitor then, it seems, was not alone in the Soviet military, and even civilian, "tops".

The war began, and Beria finally switched to a round-the-clock mode of operation. On June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created - of course, it could not have done without Beria. But this was only the beginning - on June 30, all power was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee (GOKO or GKO). It was headed by Stalin. The day before, after almost uninterrupted work in the first military week after Minsk, he experienced a daily breakdown, but quickly overcame it and harnessed himself to a military "cart" for years, loaded with a lot of big and small problems. Beria entered the first composition of the State Defense Committee. In addition to Stalin and him, Molotov (deputy

chairman), Malenkov and Voroshilov became members of the GKO. Each was a major figure, each had his own "bush" of sovereign prerogatives, but there were two "workhorses" in the first composition of the GKO: Beria and Malenkov. They really formed for many years - until the death of Stalin, a kind of business

"tandem".

On July 20, 1941, the NKGB was again merged into the NKVD under the general leadership of Beria under Merkulov, his first deputy. With the outbreak of hostilities, two deputies of Beria - Ivan Maslennikov, deputy for troops and another deputy, Sergey Kruglov, left for the front, and

responsibilities for monitoring the work of departments and departments of the NKVD of the USSR were

redistributed. The 1st Directorate (intelligence abroad) was assigned directly to the people's commissar; Investigation department for especially important cases; 2nd (operational equipment), 4th (Special Technical Bureau, HF communications) and 5th (ciphers) special departments; Secretariat of the Special Meeting; control and inspection group; Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR and TsFPO - Central Financial and Planning Department.

Enough for one person? And - only through the united

NKVD! It is significant that Beria personally left the supervision of high-frequency communications, realizing its increased importance. On the high-frequency lines, the troops spoke with Stalin, and Stalin spoke with the troops. Therefore, it is no coincidence that after the start of the war, the provision of stable secret communications for direct negotiations between the Headquarters of the High Command (later - the Supreme High Command) with the fronts and armies was completely entrusted to the NKVD of Beria. And by order of the NKVD No. 001430 dated October 2, 1941, government HF communications stood out as an independent structure within the People's Commissariat - into the Department of Government Communications of the NKVD of the USSR. And again it turned out like this: on the one hand, the people who controlled the war, more and more got into the taste of high-frequency communications, but, on the other hand, Beria himself contributed to this in every possible way. He constantly expanded the circle of HF subscribers - even on his own initiative. So, on March 27, 1942, Stalin wrote "For!" on Beria's report on the installation of high-frequency telephone sets at the heads of the rear of the active fronts, and on October 22, 1942, Beria, even without the sanction of the Supreme Commander, ordered the installation of high-frequency devices for the heads of the Air Forces of the Oryol, Stalingrad and North Caucasian districts. By October 1942, Beria achieved a decision

to bring high-frequency communications to each army operating within the fronts. But this was only part of what Beria had been doing since June 22, 1941. By order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00101 dated June 29, 1941, Beria was introduced to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The previous

order No. 00100 dated 06/29/41 was also dedicated to Beria. Here is its full text:

"Proceed immediately to the formation of 15 divisions, of which 10 are rifle and 5 are motorized. For the formation of divisions, use part of the personnel of the commanding and rank and file of the border and internal troops of the NKVD. Missing personnel to be covered from the reserve. The formation of divisions is entrusted to the people's commissar internal affairs comrade. Beria L.P.

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to provide the emerging divisions with human and material resources and weapons at the request of the NKVD.

Headquarters of the High
Command

TYMOSHENKO STALIN ZHUKOV " In fact, the formation of new military formations is the task of the army, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. But, as we see, Beria was needed here too. And he already had enough tasks - like the head of special services. I will list only some of the tasks of the military NKVD - except for the formation of divisions on the basis of the NKVD troops.
So: -

the creation of barrage detachments for the protection of the rear of the fronts; - organization of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind the front line, as well as the partisan movement; - Chekist counterintelligence (that is, countering intelligence enemy, including radio games, etc.); - the fight against sabotage and the protection of strategic facilities ...

And, of course - the external illegal intelligence of the NKVD, again passed under the hand of Beria. In addition, military counterintelligence, the Special Departments, returned to the NKVD. In February 1941, during the division of the NKVD, they were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy and transformed into the Third Directorate of these people's commissariats.

Now it was necessary to rebuild everything again - on the go. And all this - **only through the NKVD**. Well, Lavrenty Beria, who turned forty-third in 1941, met the war as a recognized master of unraveling any, including the most intricate, tangles of complex issues.

WHY, with the living people's commissar of defense, Marshal Timoshenko, the living chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov, and in the presence of the apparatus of the military department, was Chekist Beria entrusted with the formation of new army divisions? The answer is obvious: the situation demanded not just new divisions, but strong, **steadfast** divisions, and demanded **immediately!** And since Beria's border troops turned out to be the most persistent, and since Beria could do it **quickly**, Beria had to work for Timoshenko and Zhukov.

After his arrest in June 1953, Beria reminded Malenkov in a letter: ***"The first weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western Front - which the Germans strongly pressed ... Our joint work to create, under the leadership of the State Committee, the Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin, the Reserve Front to protect the approaches to Moscow ... Only for the reserve front, 15 full-blooded Chekist military divisions were organized ... "***

Of course, Beria did not then stand on the parade ground, doing drill. As always and everywhere, he selected competent executors, and left for himself the functions of control and prompt solution of those emerging problems that his subordinates could not solve. So, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Beria's Chekist ally in Transcaucasia, did a lot to form Chekist divisions. Having come to the leadership of the NKVD, Beria pulled him to Moscow as well. And it was, as always, a good choice. Under Lieutenant General Maslennikov, an operational group of five people was created with the task: "The concentration of personnel allocated from the NKVD troops must be completed by July 17." The border guards of the border districts have already fought - some in

the troops for the protection of the rear of the fronts, some surrounded or in combat units. And the new KGB divisions were formed due to the best personnel of the border troops of the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Trans-Baikal districts. Exposing even secondary sections of the border was a risky business, but the risk was justified, and from distant border circles to the places of formation, in particular to Yaroslavl, in a matter of days (for 8-11 days) from Transcaucasia and Central Asia, 3 thousand commanders and 10 thousand sergeants and privates.

Plus - 500 people each from the personnel of the units of the Leningrad, Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts that emerged from the encirclement. These people represented a golden fund at all - they were already firmly seared by the fire of war, but they only hardened in it. Total - more than 15

thousand combat core for 15 divisions. Strong cadres were also taken from the reserve of the Red Army. The border guards played the role of alloying additives in ordinary steel, and the alloy turned out great!

Almost all command positions in the divisions were occupied by border guards. Graduates of the Kharkov Cavalry Border School became platoon commanders, students of the Higher Border School became battalion commanders. The FIRST year

of the war was a particularly bitter year for the Soviet border guards. Then tens of thousands of their comrades died - wonderful guys, devoted to the Motherland and professionally able to defend it. However, the same year became for the Soviet border guards and the "star" year, because never before or after the value of the border troops for the country was not so significant! Then the fate of Russia was decided, and the border guards did so much to ensure its future then, like, perhaps, no one else. On the KGB emblem - a shield

and a sword. During the first battles with the enemy, the Chekists-border guards could not be a sword - the enemy was covered with too strong armor, and the sword of the army had to get it through this armor. But the border guards became a shield for the country, holding back and holding back the onslaught of the Wehrmacht, weakening it and winning the main condition for future victory in

those days - time. It was truly a collective feat accomplished on the scale of war and history almost instantly. And in the way it was done, Beria's style was visible. However, the People's Commissar would not be able to impose his style on the work of his subordinates if he interfered in the details. He gave the right impulse, the initial push in the right direction, and after that he moved on to another task. He didn't have two or three of them. And not even five! If

everything went as it should, Beria limited himself to receiving operational information about the progress of affairs. If something went wrong, he quickly corrected the situation and again provided the initiative

subordinates. So it was here! The decision to partially expose non-belligerent borders is up to the people's commissar. Moreover, it was not for nothing that Beria widely used the Transcaucasian border guards - they were, in fact, his direct pupils.

So, the People's Commissar gave a directive. And then - help only when it is needed. Putting together six divisions of the first stage took place at the Beria pace - ahead of schedule, because the front did not wait. In the zone of the former ZAPOVO, the current Western Front, a huge gap was formed through which German troops poured and poured into Russia. Beria's cadres had to close this gap.

The oath was taken on the way and at combat positions - this was dictated by the situation at the front. All fifteen Chekist divisions of Beria went to where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western Front, five divisions (265, 268, 262, 257 and 259th) - to the North Western. In the HISTORY of the

war, the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Baltic fronts are sonorously and gloriously marked ... The reserve front of the bitter model of 1941 is almost forgotten, and its organizer is slandered. But without the steadfastness of the Reserve Front, which covered the center of Russia in 1941, there would have been neither ten Stalinist strikes in 1944, nor the Victory itself in 1945. The border battle, although often of a stubborn nature, was generally lost by the army. And now it was necessary to think about the organization of defense in the Moscow strategic direction. On July 14, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command issued Order No. 00334 on the creation of a front of reserve armies at the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk in order to prepare

for a stubborn defense. The front included six armies (29th, 30th, 24th, 28th, 31st and 32nd), four of which were commanded by border guards: the 30th - the head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district, Major General V.A. Khomenko, who died in 1943; 31st - Chief of the Karelo Troops of the Finnish Border District, Major General V.N. Dalmatov; 24th - Chief of the troops of the Baltic border district, Major General K.I. Rakutin, who died in October 1941 and was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The 29th Army, having formed Chekist divisions, was received by Lieutenant General Maslennikov. He will

valiantly and skillfully fight, end the war as an army general, commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of four orders of Lenin, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov I degree, two orders of Kutuzov I degree.

In 1941, Maslennikov wrote to his wife from the front: "Fights are going on daily and the most bloody. We are already destroying the fourth division of the Germans. My army is in good standing ... My routine is like this. At 4-5, sometimes at 6 o'clock in the morning I go to sleep for an hour or two, then at positions up to 23, and then staff work.

In October 1948, from the post of commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Maslennikov returned to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - deputy minister, but not Beria, but Kruglov. On April 16, 1954, less than a year after the death of Beria, his military commissar during the war, Maslennikov, foreseeing the wrong arrest by the Khrushchevites, would shoot himself.

Let's return, however, to the year

1941 ... Was it accidental that out of the six armies that covered Moscow in the summer of 1941, four were commanded by border generals subordinate to Beria?

I think no. A

border guard was also appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies - the former head of the troops of the Belarusian border district, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov. On July 30, 1941, the front of the reserve armies was transformed into the Reserve Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov (he invited Bogdanov to be his deputy and he fought well, and in 1942 he died, withdrawing the troops of the 39th Army from the encirclement).

Let's calculate ... On the western border, the

war was met by about a hundred thousand border guards, and almost everyone fought for several army men. The border guards then became the last reserve of command at all levels, at whose disposal the soldiers of Beria turned out to be the will of fate and military chance. At the same time, until September 25, 1941, the border troops themselves had peacetime states, that is, they did not have means of reinforcement: anti-tank weapons, artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns ... The border guards guard the border from violators, and do not reflect the aggression of the enemy. Fighting is the task of the army.



Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko (1899-1943) - Soviet military leader, during the Great Patriotic War he commanded armies, lieutenant general



Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov (1900-1954) - Soviet military activist, general of the army. Hero of the Soviet Union



Vasily Nikitich Dalmatov (1899-1977) - Soviet military leader, major general



Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin (1902-1941) - Soviet military leader, Hero of the Soviet Union, major general



Ivan Alexandrovich Bogdanov (1897-1942) - Soviet military commander, lieutenant general

By the second half of July, in addition to the 100,000 border guards already fighting, the country received at least 100,000 soldiers of border condition, the backbone of which was 15,000 of the best border guards. And the fact that, on the one hand, it was they who were thrown to close the breakthrough, and, on the other hand, Stalin also instructed Beria's border guards to occupy a new strategic line, speaks of the outstanding role of the border troops in the initial period of the war. However, this role was already belittled in the first major research on the Great Patriotic War.

It is not appreciated to this day. Why?

Is it because it is impossible to evaluate the border troops on their merits without mentioning who prepared the border troops for war and who was responsible for the formation of 15 divisions and the creation of a front of reserve armies? From the reserve, they almost immediately became belligerents, and the Beria divisions actually broke the "blitzkrieg" in the Moscow direction. One such merit would be enough to immortalize the name of the one who organized it, but today they simply forgot about this military victory

of Beria! Someone will say that it was not Beria who fought, he did not command the armies. But he was responsible to Stalin and the Headquarters for the formation of an operational strategic reserve. But the cadres of these armies were Beria's in spirit and acumen!

ENDED IN 1941. The Red

Army conducted a successful counter-offensive near Moscow, and there were hopeful prospects for the summer of 1942. However, in reality it turned out differently - by the end of the summer of 1942, the Germans not only approached Stalingrad, but also successfully developed an offensive in the Caucasian direction.



Gasoline for the Red Army



Women in the oil fields replaced the men who went to the front



Publications in newspapers of the time



The calculation of anti-aircraft guns participates in the Battle for the Caucasus

The situation in the Caucasus by August was critical. Demonstrating his intention to deliver the main blow to Moscow by Army Group Center in 1942, Hitler considered the Blau plan to capture the Caucasus to be the main one. And the Caucasus

is, in the end, Baku. And Baku...

Well,

what is Baku, clearly!

Baku is oil. In 1942,

the Baku oil fields produced almost all the oil that provided both the front and the rear. And this is how the first, "Khrushchev" 6-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War" describes the situation. On page 461 of volume 2 it says:

"The command of the German Army Group "A" believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus had lost

fighting capacity and can no longer offer significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regroup troops with the aim of simultaneously developing an offensive against Baku and Batumi. The 1st Panzer Army was deployed with a front to the southeast and was supposed to advance ... in the direction of Grozny-Makhachkala-Baku. The 17th Army received the task of advancing from the Krasnodar region to Novorossiysk, capturing it and developing an offensive along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi-Batumi. The 491st mountain rifle corps was supposed to strike from the Cherkessk region through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range, go to the Sukhumi region and contribute to the breakthrough of the 17th army to the Black Sea

coast .. On August 18, fighting began in the passes ... ". On August 18, Beria took part in a meeting with Stalin, as well as on the night of August 20-21, where there were also generals from the General Staff Bodin and Bokov. But already on the morning of August 21, Beria, with a group of generals and officers, flew through Central Asia to Tbilisi. He returned to Moscow only on September 17, **and in less than a month, in fact, restored the Caucasian front and stabilized the situation in t**

The Khrushchevites failed to remove Beria from Soviet history with a wave of a razor. So this time, in the 13th volume of TSB-2, signed for publication on June 27, 1952, in the article "The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic", no one bothered to cut out (and how can you cut them out!?) The following lines on page 53:

"In the summer of 1942, at the cost of huge losses, the troops of the Nazi invaders broke through to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. On behalf of I.V. Stalin in these terrible days for the peoples of the USSR L.P. Beria led the defense of the Caucasus. L.P. Beria closely linked the work of the rear and the front and ensured the brilliant implementation of Stalin's plan for the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus ... "

The above is not a duty, not a front, but an accurate historical assessment of the role and merits of Beria in organizing the defense of the Caucasus. Nevertheless, in the Soviet post-Stalinist historiography, we will not find a word about Beria's participation in this defense - even in a negative way. The current anti-Soviet "historiography" did not forget about Beria in the Caucasus in 1942. It tells that the "tyrant" Beria, sent by the "tyrant" Stalin as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

to the Caucasus, interfered in every possible way with defending the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The renegade general, Brezhnev-Yeltsin political worker Dmitry Volkogonov, in the anti-Stalinist opus *Triumph and Tragedy*, writes about Beria: "Beria's military operations in the

Great Patriotic War are limited to his two trips as a member of the State Defense Committee to the Caucasus in August 1942 - March of the following year. The archives testify: here, on behalf of Stalin, he instilled fear in military workers, filmed unwanted people, and shot them. He was accompanied on those trips by Kobulov, Mamulov, Milshtein, Piyashev, Tsanova, Rukhadze, Vlodzimirsky, Karanadze, Kakuchaya, his own son. Tyulenev, Sergatskov, other military leaders got it ... "Volkogonov accuses Beria, referring to unnamed" archives "... The archives testify, in fact, to the exact opposite - about the effective and competent actions of the Stavka representative L.P. Beria. And Volkogonov does not tell

the names of the "executed" - they, in fact, did not exist. And to remove Beria really removed someone. For example, on August 28, 1942, he removed Major General Sergatskov from command of the 46th Army and appointed Major General Leselidze in his place. Those who wish can independently familiarize themselves with the combat biography of Sergatskov and Leselidze and decide whether Beria was right in removing one and appointing the other? I can only say that the gray personality of Sergatskov ended the war with such dullness, and Leselidze fought and commanded dashingly, became a Hero of the Soviet Union - alas, posthumously. BACK TO THE quotation from Volkogonov... Those mentioned by Volkogonov are Beria's old "team" in Transcaucasia. Everyone knew the local situation very well, everyone was able to start acting "half a turn." Sergo took Beria to the Caucasus, firstly, the General Staff officer Shtemenko, and, secondly, Sergo was

useful for his knowledge and wisdom.



Konstantin Nikolaevich Leselidze (1903-1944) - Soviet military leader, colonel general, Hero of the Soviet Union



Andrei Antonovich Grechko (1903-1976) - Soviet military leader, statesman and party leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1958, 1973), Hero of Czechoslovakia (1969). Minister of Defense of the USSR (1967–1976)

Merkulov, Sudoplatov, Maslennikov, Khomenko, Orlov should be added to the listed Volkogonov's associates of Beria in the defense of the Caucasus ... Chekists Merkulov, Sudoplatov, Orlov, border generals Piyashev, Khomenko, as well as General Maslennikov who fought in the Caucasus, were long-verified "cadres" of Beria. IN

In general, the fact that Beria took "his own" on a difficult trip proves that he knew how to fully trust people. But - only to those who have been tested by him more than once in specific cases.

In agreement with the Headquarters, Beria, in fact, removed Marshal Budyonny from his post as commander of the North Caucasian Front, and on September 1, 1942, Stalin, on the recommendation of Beria, decided to unite the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian Fronts into one Transcaucasian

Front. However, having arrived in the Caucasus, Lavrenty Beria not only arranged crackdowns, although, of course, they could not do without them. Beria nominated people, and not just Leselidze. So, the "godson" of Beria was the same age as Leselidze - the future Marshal Andrei Grechko. On September 8, 1942, Beria appointed him commander of the 47th Army. True, later Grechko kept quiet about such a "kinship".

The main thing that the representative of the Headquarters and a member of the GKO Beria was engaged in was the liquidation of the German breakthrough. On August 8, 1942, even before Beria left for the Caucasus, the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front was created, commanded by the Chekist, Lieutenant General Maslennikov. The idea of this appointment belonged, of course, to Beria. Now Beria himself arrived in Tbilisi to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Tyulenev, with General Bodin, Colonel Shtemenko and a group of old "Caucasians". The

cavalryman, Lieutenant General Bodin advanced during the war, by the summer of 1942 he was one of the deputy chiefs of the General Staff. Beria had a sharp eye for people, and he clearly looked after Bodin, having "married" him to the post of chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front. Bodin came to court, but died during the Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze operation in November 1942 and was buried in Tbilisi. And if he had not died, he could have gone far - with the light hand of Beria. After all, he distinguished people precisely and subtly, and supported them boldly.

With the arrival of a group of Muscovites led by Beria, a lot of work began in Tbilisi.



Pavel Ivanovich Bodin (1900-1942) - Soviet military leader, lieutenant general



Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev (1892-1978) - Soviet military leader, general of the army, full holder of the badge of the Order of St. George, Hero of the Soviet Union

Fifty-two-year-old - in 1942, Army General Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District before the war, and shortly after it began, he was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, which became the Transcaucasian Front in May 1942. Beria knew him for a long time and well, and helped him strongly. It was Beria who helped in what he could and was obliged to help in Transcaucasia - in mobilizing people, reserves and

economy. However, Beria began with questions of purely military planning, that is, with questions, in fact, military leadership. Many years after the war, Tyulenev wrote (without mentioning the name of Beria):

“Some

of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were

deployed. Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. On instructions from Moscow, we developed a new plan for the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range: it was divided into areas, headed by experienced commanders

and staffs. Tyulenev writes about Headquarters, although Beria is immediately visible behind such a concept of defense. At the same time, he, as a rule, did not get involved in operational decisions - where and what units to send, how to plan strikes, etc. He himself was so professional in what he was professional in that he always respected professionalism in others. **But the defense strategy**

of the Soviet Caucasus in 1942 was given, nevertheless, by Beria! It was necessary to control the passes, it was necessary to create a defense in depth. During August and September 1942, five or six defensive lines were built on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny and Makhachkala, and more than ten on the approaches to Baku. 90 thousand people of the local population were employed daily in the construction. Beria



Battalion leaving for the front, on the way to the station Baladzhar (Baku, Chamberikend district). 1942

But perhaps even more significant and even decisive was the role of Beria in mobilizing the economy of Transcaucasia to ensure the interests of the front. Not a word, of course, without saying a word about Beria, volume of the 2nd "Khrushchev" "History of the Great Patriotic War", published in 1961 (General Grechko was also a member of the editorial commission), reported this as

follows: "... September 9 in the republics of Transcaucasia martial law was declared. Due to the fact that the main communications connecting Transcaucasia with the industrial regions of the country turned out to be intercepted by the enemy, in Transcaucasia, on the instructions of the State

The Defense Committee increased the plan for the production of military products <... > Many enterprises, especially local industries, were completely transferred to the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment for the army <...> The increase in the production of military materials in the Transcaucasian republics allowed the State Defense Committee to reduce centralized supplies to the troops defending the Caucasus . The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from the industrial centers of the country only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms were produced on the spot.

After all, this is all about the efforts of Beria, or rather, about the efforts of the citizens of the Georgian SSR, organized by Beria! The situation in the Caucasus was turned in our favor by the efforts of millions of people, but the initial impetus for these efforts was given by him, Lavrenty Beria. Moreover, it must be remembered that the battle for the Caucasus took place against the background of the beginning battle for Stalingrad, and therefore Beria and his comrades in Transcaucasia also defended Stalingrad, allowing them to transfer as much as possible there due to the fact that the Caucasus began to do a lot on its own.